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The U.S. Reports contain no answer to a million-dollar question: are 
state prisoners constitutionally entitled to a federal habeas forum? The 
Supreme Court has consistently ducked the basic constitutional issue, and 
academic work on the question idles on familiar themes.  
The strongest existing argument that state prisoners are 
constitutionally entitled to a federal habeas forum involves a theory of 
incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. I 
provide a new and different account: specifically, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause (“PI Clause”) guarantees a 
habeas privilege as a feature of national citizenship, and that the 
corresponding habeas power reaches state custody. 
We now know that the common-law habeas writ did not evolve 
primarily as a security for individual liberty, but in service of judicial power. 
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court blessed this revised writ history. 
This Article is the second entry in a series exploring the legal implications of 
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those revisions. In the first article, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 
99 VA. L. REV. 743 (2013), I argued that Article III judicial power secured for 
federal prisoners the habeas privilege identified in the Suspension Clause. The 
question that I reserved there—and that I answer here—was whether anything 
about Reconstruction changed the operation of the habeas guarantee 
embedded in the original Articles of Constitution. 
The answer, in short, is yes. The Fourteenth Amendment PI Clause—
not the Due Process Clause—expanded the constitutionally protected scope of 
the federal habeas privilege. The PI Clause yokes the habeas privilege to 
national citizenship, the rights of which neither the federal government nor 
states may abridge. And if, as I have argued, a federally protected habeas 
privilege requires a corresponding federal habeas power, then the PI Clause 
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum.  
The first-order question I answer here—whether the Constitution 
guarantees a state-prisoner privilege—is logically antecedent to second- and 
third-order questions about the privilege’s scope. Because the Constitution 
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum, the legal community ought 
to hit reset on basic assumptions about Congressional power to restrict the 
habeas remedy, particularly in postconviction cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Reports contain no answer to a million-dollar 
question: Are state prisoners constitutionally entitled to a federal 
habeas forum to contest their custody? Endless controversy swirls 
around habeas review of state convictions, but the Supreme Court has 
consistently ducked the basic constitutional issue. Federal judges 
charge into controversies over constitutional rights of prisoners; why 
do they hesitate to declare the constitutional status of the most 
important federal remedy? 
Academic work on the question idles on familiar themes: the 
original operation of the habeas guarantee on the several states;1 the 
absence, until 1867, of a general statutory remedy for state detention;2 
or the salient features of the Supremacy Clause.3 The strongest 
 
 1.  See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126–80 
(1980) (arguing that the Suspension Clause was a restriction on congressional authority to 
interfere with state habeas process). 
 2.  See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (giving federal courts the general 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state custodians). 
 3.  See, e.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity 
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 860 (1998) 
(explaining that certain limits on federal review of state custody are unconstitutional based on a 
comprehensive theory of federal supremacy). 
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existing argument that state prisoners are constitutionally entitled to 
a federal habeas forum involves a theory of incorporation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (“DP Clause”).4 In this 
Article, I provide a different account—one based on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause (“PI Clause”). 
Specifically, I argue that the PI Clause guarantees a habeas privilege 
as a feature of national citizenship, and that the corresponding habeas 
power reaches state custody. 
A fresh account of how the habeas guarantee operates on state 
custody is timely, in part, because of the availability of new data about 
how the English privilege related to judicial authority. We now know 
that the common-law habeas writ did not evolve primarily as a 
security for individual liberty, but in service of judicial power.5 In 
Boumediene v. Bush,6 the landmark Supreme Court case holding that 
the Constitution guaranteed the habeas privilege to prisoners at the 
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the Supreme Court blessed 
much of the revised writ history.7  
This Article is the second entry in a series exploring the legal 
implications of those revisions. In the first, A Constitutional Theory of 
Habeas Power (“Habeas Power”), I argued that the Article III judicial 
power secured, for federal prisoners, the habeas privilege identified in 
the Suspension Clause.8 The question that I reserved in Habeas 
Power—and that I answer here—was whether anything about 
Reconstruction changed the operation of the habeas guarantee 
 
 4.  See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional 
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing 
that “the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized [the] supremacy-ensuring role of the federal 
courts such that Congress is obligated to make federal review of state criminal convictions 
practically available through federal habeas corpus”). 
 5.  Professor Paul D. Halliday is most responsible for this work. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, 
HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010) (providing a comprehensive historical 
perspective on the habeas writ); Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: 
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 701 (2008) 
(discussing how the “writ of habeas corpus . . . was initially fashioned by judges”).  
 6.  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 7.  Professor Halliday examined King’s Bench files, rolls, and rulebooks every fourth year, 
from 1502 to 1708. HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 319. The result was data on 2757 prisoners. Id. 
Boumediene relied heavily on this survey. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740, 747, 752 (citing Halliday 
& White, supra note 5). 
 8.  Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (2013). 
Cf. ERIC FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 10 (2003) 
(arguing that judges always enjoyed common-law habeas power to relieve unlawful custody); 
Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 607–08 (2009) 
(rejecting the view “that the Clause promises only that whatever habeas right is given by the 
grace of the legislature may not be suspended temporarily except in cases of rebellion or 
invasion”).  
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embedded in the original Articles of Constitution (“original 
Constitution”). Indeed, the PI Clause established that there were 
privileges and immunities of national citizenship, which included a 
federal habeas privilege to contest state custody. 
My argument proceeds in three Parts. In Part II, I specify the 
basic conditions defeating consensus that state prisoners are entitled 
to a federal habeas forum: (1) that there was no generally available 
federal habeas remedy for state prisoners until 1867, and (2) that 
theories accounting for a pre-1867 federal privilege for state prisoners 
invite serious objections involving text, intent, and precedent. In the 
process, I develop the habeas typology that I use to explain the 
normative positions I take in the remainder of the Article. 
Part III shows that the PI Clause expanded the 
constitutionally protected scope of the federal habeas privilege, though 
not through the familiar mechanics of Fourteenth Amendment 
“incorporation.” The PI Clause restricts state governments by the 
familiar injunction that “[n]o State shall . . . abridge,” but it also 
restricts the federal government by declaring privileges of national 
citizenship. The PI Clause yokes the habeas privilege to American 
citizenship, and that connection remains unsevered even as the 
Slaughter-House Cases otherwise reduced the Clause to a 
constitutional afterthought.9 
In Part IV, I argue that, in combination with the habeas 
privilege recognized in the original Constitution, the PI Clause 
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum. The first-order 
question I answer here—whether the Constitution guarantees some 
sort of state-prisoner privilege—is logically antecedent to second- and 
third-order questions about its scope. Because the Constitution does 
entitle state prisoners to a federal habeas forum, then the legal 
community ought to hit reset on basic assumptions about 
congressional power to restrict the habeas remedy, particularly in the 
postconviction setting. If I am right, then multiple postconviction 
provisions supplied by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)10 require renewed constitutional scrutiny.11 
 
 9.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872) (limiting the PI Clause to a few structural rights of 
national citizenship). 
 10.  Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified in part at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2244–67 (2012)). 
 11.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing postconviction application in greater detail). The 
Supreme Court takes this dispute quite seriously, as evidenced by its equivocation. See, e.g., 
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996) (“But we assume, for purposes of decision here, 
that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than 
as it existed in 1789.”). 
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II. THE BASIC PROBLEM 
The federal habeas privilege entitles a prisoner to argue, in 
federal court, that custody is unlawful. The privilege corresponds to 
judicial power over the prisoner’s custodian. Every time Congress 
enacts new restrictions on federal habeas review of state custody—
including restrictions on postconviction review—courts sniff at the 
idea that a restriction might be unconstitutional, but they always 
walk away. One reason they are unwilling to seriously entertain a 
constitutional challenge is that there is no consensus around even the 
basic proposition that the Constitution entitles state prisoners to any 
habeas forum. 
Part II presents the basic problem. The fact that the original 
Constitution or the Bill of Rights (“Bill”) entitled state prisoners to a 
federal habeas forum is tough to reconcile with Congress having 
provided no statutory habeas remedy until 1867.12 Maybe the 
Constitution was interpreted too restrictively before 1867, and maybe 
that restrictive precedent should be discounted accordingly. But such 
opening caveats would severely degrade the type of account I want to 
provide here. Rooting the state-prisoner privilege in the PI Clause 
requires no such caveats, because the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1868. 
Even after clearing roadblocks thrown up by almost eighty 
years of American constitutional history, there are still significant 
problems lurking in a Fourteenth Amendment account. The 
proposition that an amendment directed primarily to state action 
actually restricts federal power requires an argument that pirouettes 
through various objections rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
text, intent, structure, and precedent. 
A. The Habeas Privilege and Judicial Power 
The first step in a constitutional account of the habeas 
guarantee is to distinguish a prisoner’s privilege from both the judicial 
power to which it corresponds and the suspension rules that permit its 
restriction. The power to issue a habeas writ and to review custody 
belongs to courts and judicial officers.13 The privilege is a prisoner’s 
 
 12.  Congress provided a federal habeas review for a very limited category of state custody 
in 1833 and in 1842. See infra note 60 (citing Act of August 29, 1842 and Act of March 2, 1833). 
 13.  The English power to issue common-law habeas writs—the obvious forerunner to the 
parallel American power—was exercised by “[a]nyone designated as a ‘judge’ or ‘justice.’ ” 
BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION & POST-
CONVICTION LITIGATION 14 (2013). For example, Barons of Exchequer and Justices in Common 
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entitlement to ask that the habeas power be exercised.14 So if a federal 
privilege exists, so too would a corresponding federal judicial power. 
The privilege-power pairing is native to English common law, which 
helps explain the rule against suspending the habeas privilege in the 
original Constitution’s Suspension Clause.15 
English common-law habeas writs—and there were several 
types—ordered a jailor to produce a prisoner for some purpose: to 
move the prisoner to another court, to secure testimony, and so on and 
so forth. Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which was a later-
developing habeas writ, ordered a prisoner to be produced so a judge 
could decide whether a jailor was exercising “lawful custody.” The 
concept of “lawful custody” is perpetually evolving, but the basic 
habeas guarantee ensures that a judge may inspect custodial 
authority and discharge the prisoner. A habeas writ was denominated 
as an English privilege because an English subject enjoyed the 
benefits of process issued at the behest of a royal court.16 
America’s constitutional guarantee reflects the common-law 
privilege, as well as the power of suspension exercised by English 
monarchs. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 provides that “[t]he Privilege 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” This 
Clause does not actually create a suspension power—let alone the 
privilege. It simply restricts a suspension power that presumably 
comes from Article I, Section 8.17 Section 8 enumerates legislative 
powers and also vests Congress with auxiliary powers that are 
“necessary and proper” to exercise them. The suspension power might 
be auxiliary to any number of enumerated powers: the power to 
provide for the common defense;18 the power to govern the land and 
 
Pleas could issue the writ. Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 
523, 525–26 n.7 (1923). Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), interpreted the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 to empower both courts and judges to issue habeas writs. See id. at 94–100. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241, the modern source of federal habeas power, vests authority in both courts and judges. Id. 
at § 2241(a)–(b). 
 14.  This understanding of the relationship between the privilege and the corresponding 
judicial power is long established. See 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, 
at 107 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904).  
 15.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 16.  See Halliday & White, supra note 5, at 630 (noting that the writ of habeas corpus was 
traditionally understood as “originating in the concept of the king’s mercy”). 
 17.  This characterization makes more sense if one appreciates context. The Suspension 
Clause appears alongside several limits on otherwise-appropriate legislative power: the 
prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, the rule forbidding Congress from 
restricting the slave trade until 1808, et cetera. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 18.  Id. § 8, cl. 1. 
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naval forces;19 or the power to “provide for calling forth the militia to 
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel 
invasions.”20 The most likely font of suspension power, however, is the 
enumerated authority to constitute the federal judiciary.21 The 
important point is that the Suspension Clause merely restricts the 
suspension power. Everything else about habeas corpus, including the 
habeas power and the privilege itself, is a more active inferential 
exercise.22 
B. A Typology of Habeas Privilege 
The normative position I take in Parts III and IV—that the PI 
Clause entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum—is built on 
top of a descriptive framework for classifying potential privilege 
features. I develop the typology here, and I refer to it frequently 
throughout the Article. The easiest way to classify the privilege’s scope 
is in three dimensions: (a) the sovereign from which the habeas power 
of judges springs, (b) the sovereign authority under which a prisoner is 
detained, and (c) the sovereign furnishing the law under which 
custody is potentially unlawful. For my purposes, there is actually no 
need to visually represent outcomes in dimension (c) because the U.S. 
Constitution secures some privilege to contest custody that might be 
in violation of federal law. Figure 1 therefore depicts the potential 
privilege features in two dimensions. 
 
  
 
 19.  Id. at cl. 12–14. 
 20.  Id. at cl. 15. 
 21.  Id. at cl. 9. 
 22.  But cf. Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 602–03 n.94 
(2010) (noting that “[n]ot all legal commentators have agreed that . . . the Suspension 
Clause . . . provides Congress with the power to suspend habeas” but concluding that such a 
reading is superior to other accounts of the suspension power). I remain skeptical that the 
Suspension Clause—which appears in a list of Article I, § 9 limits on powers established 
elsewhere in the Constitution—contains text that expressly limits habeas power but also does 
double duty as an implicit source of the power so limited. The Supreme Court, at times, has 
recognized the shortcomings of the Suspension-Clause-as-suspension-power theory. See, e.g., 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 619–20 (1842) (“No express power is given to 
congress . . . to suspend the writ in cases of rebellion or invasion. And yet it would be difficult to 
say . . . that it ought not to be deemed, by necessary implication, within the scope of the 
legislative power of congress.”); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the suspension power comes from somewhere other than Article I, 
§ 9). 
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Figure 1: Potential Forum-Custody Configurations 
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To state my thesis most simply, I argue that the PI Clause added Type 
2 features to the habeas privilege that the Constitution guarantees. 
As I argued in Habeas Power, the original Constitution 
guaranteed only a Type 1 privilege: a federal forum for federal 
prisoners.23 Although I do not want to rehash Habeas Power, two of its 
conclusions are important here. First, the original Constitution 
guaranteed habeas process; Congress was not free to withhold habeas 
jurisdiction from federal courts.24 Second, the original Constitution’s 
habeas guarantee did not “apply to the states.” In other words, at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, the Federal Constitution did not 
entitle state prisoners to habeas process in any court.25 
In Habeas Power, I explained that the best interpretation of 
constitutional text before the Fourteenth Amendment—in light of 
history, structure, and established maxims of federal jurisdiction—is 
as a guarantee of a federal habeas privilege to contest federal 
custody.26 Before going further here, I want to reiterate the problems 
with a school of habeas thought in which the original Constitution 
guaranteed no federal privilege at all. Understanding defects in that 
account of the privilege will in turn help readers understand the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s effect. In terms of Figure 1, no-federal-
 
 23.  Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 773–95; see also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1267 (1970) (concluding that the Framers contemplated a Type 1 
privilege); Steiker, supra note 4, at 872 (collecting sources and concluding that “the general 
thrust of these positions is that the Suspension Clause requires the federal judiciary to provide a 
check against potential abuses of federal power”). 
 24.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 754 (arguing that “Congress cannot restrict the 
prerogative of a federal judge to decide whether federal custody is ‘lawful’ ”). 
 25.  See id. at 809 (laying the framework of the Habeas Power Theory). But cf. FREEDMAN, 
supra note 8, at 10 (concluding that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was supposed to allow courts to 
discharge unlawfully detained prisoners); Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 
1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 649 (same). 
 26.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 773–94 (refuting two theories “that are inconsistent 
with the principle that Article III vests and the Suspension Clause protects the power of a 
federal judge to review federal custody”).  
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privilege arguments might sustain a Type 3 privilege—a state habeas 
privilege to contest federal custody—or they might support an 
undepicted outcome in which the Constitution guarantees neither a 
state nor a federal privilege. Because my account treats the original 
Constitution as guaranteeing a federal privilege to contest federal 
custody, readers should understand why that assumption is 
appropriate. Habeas Power, which is an article-length defense of that 
assumption, includes extensive treatment of each alternative 
discussed below.27 
1. The No-Federal-Privilege Hypotheses 
Dissenting in INS v. St. Cyr,28 Justice Scalia speculated that 
the Constitution may not guarantee any privilege whatsoever. He 
noted that the language of Article I, Section 9 only limits a suspension 
power, and that it does not explicitly provide for the privilege to which 
the suspension power applies.29 Justice Scalia was parroting an 
argument made many years before by Professor Rex Collings.30 Justice 
Scalia mused about this possibility before discussing in greater depth 
the originalist alternative: that the scope of the habeas guarantee was 
frozen in 1789.31 When given the opportunity to reprise the view that 
the Suspension Clause referenced a privilege that need not exist, 
Justice Scalia declined. In Boumediene v. Bush,32 not a single Justice 
expressed doubt that the Constitution furnished a habeas guarantee 
of some sort.33 
 
 27.  See id. at 781–94 (addressing the “Null Power Hypothesis” and the “Inter-Sovereign 
Habeas Hypothesis”). 
 28.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001).  
 29.  See id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightforward reading of this text discloses 
that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but 
merely provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”). 
 30.  See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional Right or 
Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 341–42 (1952). The position ultimately reflects Chief 
Justice Marshall’s dictum in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), stating that, absent 
a statute, “the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be 
enacted.” Id. at 95. 
 31.  See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (assuming, for the sake of argument, 
that the Suspension Clause grants “some constitutional minimum of habeas relief”). 
 32.  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 33.  There were two Boumediene dissenting opinions, one by Justice Scalia and one by Chief 
Justice Roberts. Id. at 801–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 826–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Four Justices joined each dissent. Justice Roberts argued that, even if the habeas privilege did 
extend to such detention, Congress enacted a substitute remedial process that was 
constitutionally “adequate and effective” to test custody. Id. at 808 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
Justice Scalia argued that there was no federal privilege available to “unlawful enemy 
combatants” who were not U.S. citizens and who were not detained either in one of the fifty 
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The Supreme Court mothballed the Scalia/Collings theory for 
good reason: the interpretive work necessary to deny the existence of 
any privilege whatsoever is substantial.34 The framers of the original 
Constitution and the Bill did not write constitutional text purporting 
to create rights.35 The framers of each document labored under 
theories of natural law in which rights were “recognized” or “declared” 
because they preexisted constitutions.36 The Constitution bars 
suspension of the habeas privilege but lacks express language of 
creation because the Framers believed such language was 
unnecessary.37 Suspension was one of the defining English abuses of 
the revolutionary struggle,38 and those abuses were on the minds of 
those responsible for framing and ratifying the original Constitution.39 
Some of the drafters fought about the language in the Suspension 
Clause, but they did not disagree that the privilege existed. What they 
clashed over was whether the habeas privilege required an express 
textual guarantee and whether it could ever be suspended.40 The axis 
of disagreement was the same at state ratifying conventions.41 
 
states or in a federal territory. Id. at 826–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neither opinion entertained 
the idea that the Federal Constitution did not secure a habeas privilege. Id. at 801–26 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting); id. at 826–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34.  See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After I.N.S. v. 
St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 570–87 (2002) (comprehensively rejecting Justice 
Scalia’s St. Cyr dissent). 
 35.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
1193, 1206 (1992); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: 
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 
636–38 (2009); Howard Jay Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 
3, 3–4 (1954); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 610 (1993). 
 36.  See Amar, supra note 35, at 1206–08. 
 37.  Virtually all of THE FEDERALIST No. 84 was devoted to the idea that the Constitution’s 
failure to specify certain rights should not be interpreted as a decision to exclude them. See THE 
FEDERALIST No. 84, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton). The habeas privilege would be a particularly 
poor candidate to read out of the Constitution because it is referenced in the Suspension Clause. 
See Paschal, supra note 25, at 608–09, 611. 
 38.  Parliament authorized King George III to suspend the privilege in the American 
colonies during the Revolutionary War and renewed the suspension statute five times. Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act, 1782, 22 Geo. 3, c. 1 (Eng.) (renewal); Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 
1781, 21 Geo. 3, c. 2 (Eng.) (renewal); Continuance of Acts Act, 1780, 20 Geo. 3, c. 5 (Eng.) 
(renewal); Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, 1779, 19 Geo. 3, c. 1 (Eng.) (renewal); Habeas Corpus 
Suspension Act, 1778, 18 Geo. 3, c. 1 (Eng.) (renewal); Treason Act, 1777, 17 Geo. 3, c. 9 (Eng.). 
 39.  The American colonists followed suspension activity in broadly circulated newspapers. 
HALLIDAY, supra note 5, at 253; JUSTIN J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 33 (2011). 
 40.  Specifically, ten states voted on the proposed wording, and three states lodged the 
initial objection that the privilege was not sufficiently secured: Georgia, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina. GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 13, at 46; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 438 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). At least in St. Cyr, Justice Scalia makes 
confused use of this information. He argued that four state ratifying conventions lodged an 
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2. The State-Habeas Hypothesis 
A moderated variation on the Scalia/Hollings position is 
Professor William Duker’s argument that the original Constitution 
contemplated a Type 3 privilege: a state privilege to contest federal 
custody.42 This position has spawned some nuanced accounts that are 
stronger than Duker’s,43 but I focus on Duker’s position in the interest 
of space.44 State courts did frequently grant habeas relief for federal 
 
objection to the Constitution’s failure to include express words of creation, and that such 
objections indicate that the original meaning of the Suspension Clause was ambiguous. INS v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001). The states, however, were mollified by assurances that, despite 
the peculiar wording of Article I, § 9, the habeas privilege was constitutionally secured. In other 
words, the implication to be drawn from the objections of the state ratifying conventions and the 
responses thereto is precisely the opposite of that advanced by Justice Scalia. Id.  
 41.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 780. 
 42.  See DUKER, supra note 1, at 126–80. The appeal of a Type 3 privilege will not be 
immediately apparent to most readers. Contrary to Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411–12 
(1871) (holding that the Supremacy Clause precluded state courts from issuing writs of habeas 
corpus for federal prisoners), states had all kinds of power to enforce federal law in state courts; 
but the privilege referenced in the Suspension Clause is still a federal privilege. The argument 
that the Suspension Clause referenced a state privilege to contest federal custody is less an 
assessment of original meaning or intent and more of an attempt to reconcile a privilege with the 
Madisonian Compromise and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803). Pursuant 
to the Madisonian Compromise, there need be no inferior federal courts. Under Marbury, the 
Supreme Court cannot exercise original jurisdiction other than that specified as original in 
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. Id. If Congress eliminated the lower federal courts, and if the 
Supreme Court could not issue habeas writs, then the only account on which there remains a 
habeas remedy is if state courts provide it. For many people, then, a Type 3 privilege allows an 
interpreter to honor the principle that there must always be some sort of available habeas 
remedy. There nonetheless remain substantial problems with this version of the Type 3 
privilege: it still gives short shrift to the importance of federal supremacy, and the pertinent 
precedent cannot sustain interpretation necessary to make the theory work. Kovarsky, supra 
note 8, at 792–94. For what it’s worth, were the Supreme Court to confront a situation where 
Congress eliminated lower federal courts and the Justices were asked to exercise original habeas 
jurisdiction, there are at least two options preferable to a holding that there is no habeas 
guarantee. First, the Justices could have habeas relief in their individual capacities. Edward A. 
Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251, 254 (2005). Second, 
the Supreme Court could overturn Marbury’s interpretation of Article III, § 2, which many 
believe Chief Justice Marshall concocted to force the constitutional conflict, giving rise to judicial 
review. Kovarsky, supra note 8, 784–85 nn.168–77 and accompanying text (collecting authority). 
 43.  Others have interpreted Supreme Court decisions rejecting the assertion of a state 
privilege to contest federal custody as a statutory preemption question. See, e.g., Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1510 (1987) (arguing that pertinent 
cases should be read as rules about implied exclusivity of the federal habeas statute); David L. 
Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 
64 n.17 (2006) (endorsing the view that, because Congress need not ordain and establish lower 
federal courts, the Suspension Clause restricts federal authority to interfere with a state 
privilege in instances where there is no federal remedy). 
 44.  For a more thorough treatment of the problems, see Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 786–92. 
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custody during the early nineteenth century.45 Indeed, the use of state 
habeas process to restrain a perceived federal leviathan might have 
been normatively appealing to many at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Just because state courts exercised habeas power to review 
federal custody, however, does not mean that the Constitution 
guaranteed it. 
If the habeas privilege specified in the Suspension Clause 
contemplated state habeas process, and if state process was the means 
of securing the privilege, then one might expect to find a wealth of 
nineteenth-century discussion about whether state limits on the 
privilege were unconstitutional. I have yet to see any such discourse. 
Nor do the list of restrictions on states appearing in Article I, Section 
10 of the original Constitution suggest that states must honor a 
habeas privilege. Professor Duker tries to skirt these objections by 
contending that the Federal Constitution really made no habeas 
guarantee whatsoever.46 In this respect, Professor Duker’s position 
basically reduces to the Collings/Scalia argument, and it is vulnerable 
to the same criticisms.47 For example, Professor Duker’s argument, 
like the Collings/Scalia position, selectively quotes Alexander 
Hamilton48 and incorrectly interprets explanations provided to state 
ratifying conventions as excluding a federal privilege.49 
In any event, the Supreme Court invalidated state habeas 
power to discharge federal prisoners in two cases bookending the Civil 
War: Ableman v. Booth50 and Tarble’s Case.51 Tarble expresses a 
general view of judicial power that is inconsistent with virtually 
everything we know about the concurrency of state jurisdiction.52 
 
 45.  See In re Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 592, 594–95 (N.Y. 1867) (collecting cases); DUKER, supra 
note 1, at 178 n.192 (same); see also Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, 
Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (“At the very 
beginning of the nineteenth century, most state courts continued to draw their authority to issue 
the writ from their common-law powers which preceded independence.”). 
 46.  DUKER, supra note 1, at 155 (“[The Federal Constitution] did not provide security 
against state interference, nor did it require a state to provide for the writ.”). 
 47.  See supra Part II.B.1 (describing these criticisms in greater detail). 
 48.  Compare DUKER, supra note 1, at 133 (evaluating Hamilton’s position) with THE 
FEDERALIST Nos. 83 and 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the habeas privilege was 
provided for “in the plan of the convention” and observing that New York law lacked the 
protection for the privilege appearing in the Federal Constitution). 
 49.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 791–92. 
 50.  62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514 (1859). 
 51.  80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409–10 (1871). 
 52.  Tarble suggests that state courts lack the authority to enforce federal law. See id. at 
407 (“[N]either [National nor State government] can intrude with its judicial process into the 
domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National 
government . . . .”). In fact, state courts were the primary forum for federal questions for many 
years, until Congress permanently vested lower federal courts with general federal question 
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Although the Court reasons from this problematic generalization, it 
reaches a specific conclusion that is probably right for other reasons. 
As a practical matter, state habeas power to discharge federal 
prisoners would seriously disrupt the operative supremacy of federal 
law.53 Moreover, the English concept of a suspended privilege strongly 
suggests that suspension power vests in the sovereign that provides 
the privilege to contest custody.54 Put differently, the Constitution 
would not have vested a federal suspension power unless federal 
courts were the forum intended to adjudicate the privilege.55 Finally, 
even if Tarble was wrongly decided, the result would be that state 
courts were permitted to exercise habeas power, not that Type 3 
features were the subject of the constitutional guarantee. 
3. A Privilege to a Federal Forum 
Insofar as the original Constitution is concerned, the remaining 
privilege possibilities are both federal. Privilege Type 1 is a federal 
privilege to contest federal custody, and privilege Type 2 is a federal 
privilege to contest state custody. In Habeas Power, I argued at length 
that the original Constitution contemplated only a federal habeas 
forum to contest federal custody: a Type 1 privilege.56 Professor Eric 
Freedman has argued forcefully that the original Constitution secured 
a habeas privilege with both Type 1 and Type 2 features,57 but I part 
 
jurisdiction in 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (“[T]he circuit courts of the 
United States shall have original cognizance . . . arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States . . . .”); cf. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477–78 (1981) (citing 
THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that, pursuant to intended 
constitutional design, state courts routinely adjudicate Article III subject matter); LARRY W. 
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 152–53 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing that Tarble belies “the conventional 
understanding that Congress might never have created the lower federal courts and might have 
relied, instead, on state courts to police the system”). 
 53.  Those reading Tarble as an implied preemption case—a theory identified in note 43, 
supra—would argue that the supremacy-inhibiting features of a Type 3 privilege would be 
minimal because Congress could simply pass a federal habeas statute to short-circuit officious 
state habeas activity. 
 54.  The English “privilege” was suspended by the sovereign, and the habeas benefit was 
denominated as a privilege of English subjecthood because it entailed access to a court deriving 
its power from that same English sovereign. Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 762. 
 55.  The states might “suspend” their own habeas privileges, but the Framers would not 
have used the word “suspend” to refer to federal interference with a state privilege. 
 56.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 773–94; see also Developments in the Law—Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1267 (1970) (“The framers’ decision to single out habeas 
corpus for particular protection against congressional ‘suspension’ suggests that they assumed 
that habeas jurisdiction would exist in some court for federal prisoners.”). 
 57.  See FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 14–19, 29 (“[A]lmost all of the participants in the 
ratification debates expected the Clause to protect the independent judicial examination on 
federal habeas corpus of all imprisonments, state or federal.”). 
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ways with Professor Freedman for reasons that I will elaborate upon 
shortly. 
Absent a statute meeting the suspension criteria, any 
legislation substantially restricting judicial power corresponding with 
the Type 1 privilege is and always has been, in my view, 
unconstitutional.58 The idea that the privilege in the original 
Constitution had Type 2 features—that it entailed federal power to 
review state custody—is a more difficult sell. Whatever the Framers 
actually thought, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not provide for federal 
habeas review of state custody. The Act stated, “[W]rits of habeas 
corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in [jail], unless where they 
are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United 
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same . . . .”59 
Congress enacted limited habeas review of certain types of state 
custody in 1833 and again in 1842,60 but did not ratify a generally 
applicable state-prisoner privilege until 1867.61 
Professor Freedman has argued that, in Ex parte Bollman,62 
Chief Justice Marshall incorrectly interpreted the grant of habeas 
jurisdiction in the 1789 Judiciary Act.63 Chief Justice Marshall 
observed that federal courts could not conduct habeas review of state 
custody,64 and Professor Freedman argues that Bollman set the 
United States down the course of law that erroneously restricted 
federal habeas relief.65 I agree with parts of Professor Freedman’s 
account. Specifically, I agree that Chief Justice Marshall made mince 
meat of section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act; but even a proper 
interpretation of section 14 still would have given federal courts or 
 
 58.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 795 (“It is federal judicial power to determine whether a 
federal prisoner’s custody is unconstitutional . . . . Congress may not break this prerogative 
under legislative saddle . . . .”). 
 59.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789). 
 60.  See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (“[A]ny district court of the United 
States . . . in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs 
of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner . . . in custody . . . of the United States, or any one of 
them.”); Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634–35 (extending the writ to all prisoners 
confined under authority of federal law). 
 61.  Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. 
 62.  Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (Cranch 4) 75 (1807). 
 63.  See Eric Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex parte 
Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 536 (2000) (“[T]he mistake is that, according to 
dicta inserted by Chief Justice John Marshall into Ex Parte Bollman, Section 14 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 withheld from state prioners access to the federal writ . . . ”). 
 64.  See Bollman, 8 U.S. at 99 (opining that the proviso at the end of section 14 applied to 
the first sentence, as well as the second). 
 65.  See Freedman, supra note 63, at 537 (“Marshall’s misreading . . . survives to cloud 
Suspension Clause Analysis.”). 
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judges no power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to 
state custodians.66 Perhaps more importantly, a successful theory 
probably has to accommodate the consequences of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s interpretation: until Congress changed the habeas statute 
in 1867, courts generally ruled that state prisoners could not invoke 
the federal privilege to relieve unlawful custody.67 
In fact, many who believe that federal prisoners are entitled to 
a federal habeas forum nonetheless deny a constitutional guarantee 
for state prisoners.68 That result is normatively appealing to those 
who believe that, with respect to enforcing constitutional guarantees, 
state judges have brains and will equal to those of their federal 
counterparts.69 For many, the specter of lower federal judges using 
habeas process to review state judgments is, at best, “unseemly.”70 
The varied privilege configurations and corresponding 
implications yield the simple question I posed at the outset: Is there 
any persuasive account on which the Constitution guarantees a 
federal habeas forum to state prisoners? (There is.) Moreover, if I 
concede that the Constitution did not originally guarantee a privilege 
with Type 2 features, can that account be developed on the back of 
some other substantial constitutional event? (It can.) 
 
 66.  The proviso at the end of section 14 may have restricted only the habeas power given to 
federal judges in the second sentence, and not the habeas power given to federal courts in the 
first sentence. Indeed, that distinction is the crux of Professor Freedman’s argument. See id. at 
575–76 (“Soundly read, the proviso limits judges but not courts.”). I am nonetheless skeptical 
that the first sentence of section 14 was intended to give courts the authority to issue writs of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; the better reading is that the first sentence was vesting federal 
courts with authority to issue other kinds of habeas writs auxiliary to other forms of jurisdiction. 
See Dallin H. Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. 
REV. 153, 176.  
 67.  See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1845) (rejecting proposition that habeas relief 
might issue simply because state law “was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States”). 
On several occasions, federal judges expressed frustration that they lacked habeas power to 
relieve unlawful custody. See, e.g., Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 496–97 (C.C.D.S.C. 
1823) (holding that, even though state act should be void as unconstitutional, there was no 
federal habeas remedy); Ex parte Cabrera, 4 F. Cas. 964, 966 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (statement of 
Washington, J.) (expressing principle that federal courts may not relieve even illegal state 
custody). 
 68.  See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 64 (1956) (“Nor is it likely that 
the Court would presently accept the rather elaborate argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment retroactively inflated the scope of the constitutional privilege to include the newly 
created federal rights to protection against state action.”). 
 69.  See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 504 (1963) (“[R]esentment among state . . . judges, many of 
them surely as conscientious in their adherence to the Constitution and as intellectually honest 
as their critics, counsels . . . against . . . indiscriminate expansion [of habeas jurisdiction] without 
principled justification.”). 
 70.  Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886). 
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The PI Clause declared that a federal privilege for state 
prisoners was incident to national citizenship. I have located two other 
major attempts to deduce a general Type 2 privilege from some 
features of the Reconstruction Amendments,71 but they are deficient in 
respects that I will address in Section III.C. Even after identifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment as the constitutional event guaranteeing a 
modified privilege, the account must still show how the Type 1 
privilege gains Type 2 features upon contact with the PI Clause. The 
challenge is to show that the PI Clause extended the guarantee of a 
federal forum to state prisoners. 
C. The Stakes 
If the PI Clause guarantees a privilege with Type 2 features, 
then Congress cannot repeal the judicial power that secures it. 
Although a repeal scenario is farfetched, scenarios in which Congress 
imposes substantial statutory restrictions are not. In fact, many 
restrictive scenarios have already materialized,72 often precipitating 
dramatic institutional and academic clashes over state-prisoner 
remedies.73 
If the Federal Constitution does not require a federal habeas 
privilege for state prisoners—and if the greater legislative power to 
revoke the privilege includes the lesser power to limit it—then there 
can be little dispute as to the constitutionality of limiting federal 
habeas power over state custodians. Establishing the constitutional 
 
 71.  See Michael P. O’Connor, Time Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia About the History 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 KY. L.J. 659, 662 (2005) (contending that the PI clause 
means that Congress may not strip federal habeas jurisdiction over “claims predicated upon 
race-based deprivation of liberty”); Steiker, supra note 4, at 867–68 (arguing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “incorporates” the habeas privilege against the states through the DP Clause, with 
the process of incorporation transforming the habeas privilege into one that may reach state 
custody). 
 72.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2012) (imposing various restrictions on claims appearing 
in successive habeas petitions lodged by state inmates); id. § 2244(d) (creating a statute of 
limitations applicable to all federal habeas claims by state inmates); id. § 2254(d)(1) (excepting 
from the general rule—that federal habeas relief is unavailable for claims decided on the merits 
in state court—cases where the state decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 
(1996) (deciding the constitutionality of AEDPA restriction on successive state-prisoner 
petitions). 
 73.  Compare, e.g., Bator, supra note 69, at 463–64 (depicting mid-twentieth-century 
Supreme Court law permitting extensive habeas relitigation by state inmates as an expansion 
from previous understandings of the writ), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas 
Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 661–63 (1982) (arguing that Professor 
Bator’s theory of the federal privilege for state inmates was too restrictive). Professors Bator and 
Peller are the two figures most readily associated with the two major sides in the debate. 
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status of a Type 2 privilege is therefore a necessary precondition to 
any argument that there might be something other than popular will 
resisting its contraction. 
III. THE HABEAS PRIVILEGE OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 
Among other things, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
embraced the concept of national citizenship: “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”74 
Setting aside momentarily that The Slaughter-House Cases 
forever disfigured the PI Clause,75 the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment believed that the habeas privilege belonged to a set of 
privileges and immunities defined by national citizenship. And, even 
after Slaughter-House, the habeas privilege remains one of the few 
lifelike features of an otherwise “cadaverous” constitutional 
provision.76 Those of all interpretive stripes should be able to agree 
that the PI Clause encompasses the habeas privilege. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment traffics in two kinds of 
status: personhood and citizenship. The PI Clause was, in part, a 
simple response to the Black Codes and their enabling precedent,77 
Dred Scott v. Sandford.78 Dred Scott, of course, held that African 
Americans were persons but not U.S. citizens—that they were not 
 
 74.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 75.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75 (1872). 
 76.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
180 (1989). 
 77.  More precisely, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012)), was targeted at the Black Codes, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to constitutionalize the nondiscrimination rules that the Civil Rights Act 
contained, and also to establish a clear textual source of congressional power to pass civil rights 
legislation. See George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused 
and Confused, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 309, 312–13. Several scholars have argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s exclusive purpose was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act, most 
notably Raoul Berger. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 457–58 (2d ed. 1977) (“The historical records all but 
incontrovertibly establish that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . confined it to 
protection of carefully enumerated rights against State discrimination.”). I obviously join a 
crowded group rejecting that view. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 63 (1988) (“The debates on the Fourteenth 
Amendment were. . . debates about high politics and fundamental principles . . . . The debates by 
themselves did not reduce the vague, open-ended, and sometimes clashing principles used by the 
debaters to precise, carefully bounded legal doctrine. That would be the task of the courts . . . .”). 
 78.  60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
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constitutionally entitled to the rights, privileges, and immunities of 
national citizenship.79 Section 1’s first sentence straightforwardly 
rebuked Dred Scott: “[A]ll persons born or naturalized in the United 
States . . . are citizens of the United States.”80 The second sentence of 
Section 1, among other things, forbids states from abridging the 
privileges and immunities of “citizens of the United States.”81 The 
formula is elegant and powerful: the Fourteenth Amendment declares 
a national citizenship, binds it to a bundle of privileges and 
immunities, and prohibits states from abridging them. The syllogistic 
conclusion is unavoidable. If all persons born or naturalized in the 
United States are entitled to rights of national citizenship, and if a 
person is born in the United States, then that person is entitled to the 
privileges and immunities that such status entails. Part III explains 
that, no matter what position one takes on Slaughter-House and the 
potential meaning of the PI Clause, the bundle of national citizenship 
rights includes a habeas privilege. 
I should quickly pause to comment on methodology. The 
account I advance here is appealing in part because it need not reduce 
to a debate about the proper approach to constitutional interpretation 
and construction. My account can be sustained without fervent 
commitment to any strain of textualism or originalism, and without 
an adventurous foray into the cluster of theories we might describe 
under the umbrella of “living constitutionalism.” Nor do I need a 
global interpretive theory to justify cherry-picked precedent; one of my 
account’s signal virtues is its consistency with Slaughter-House and 
its progeny.82 The only interpretive proposition upon which my 
account relies is the rather boring idea that judges should follow legal-
process norms of judging: they should strive to cohere various sources 
of law as expressed in judicial decisions, authoritative texts, and 
normed behavior.83 The strength of my account is that it exhibits such 
coherence, unlike other theories under which Congress enjoys only 
limited authority to restrict habeas review of state custody. 
 
 79.  See id. at 407 (“[N]either the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor 
their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the 
people . . . ”). 
 80.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See infra Part III.B (describing the difficulties precedent has created for incorporation 
analysis). 
 83.  Readers may recognize this interpretive position as Professor Richard Fallon’s 
“constructivist coherence” theory. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–93 (1987). 
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A. Original Meaning 
The Thirty-Ninth Congress submitted the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states,84 and it also passed the Reconstruction Act 
requiring that the rebellious states ratify the Amendment as a 
precondition to restoration.85 When the first session opened, neither 
house of Congress would seat members from the former confederacy.86 
Of the Congressmen seated for the first session, roughly seventy-five 
percent were Republican. Understanding the internal dynamics of 
that Republican coalition is indispensible to interpreting the 
Amendment.87 
The legislators framing and states ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood the habeas privilege referenced in the 
Suspension Clause to be a “privilege . . . of citizens of the United 
States.”88 The relationship runs far deeper than the superficial 
observation that the word “privilege” appears in both constitutional 
provisions. In fact, the habeas privilege was one of the central rights 
contemplated by the PI Clause. The Supreme Court ultimately 
gummed up application of the PI Clause, but I will not take up the 
decisional mayhem until Section III.B. The starting points for 
understanding how members of the so-called Rump Congress and 
their constituents viewed privileges and immunities of citizenship are 
(1) the “privileges and immunities” language in Article IV,89 and (2) 
 
 84.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148–49 (1866). 
 85.  Republican members struggled with the other sections in the Amendment: voting 
qualifications for disloyal citizens and how to calibrate congressional representation to reflect the 
anticipated disenfranchisement of freedmen. See JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 8–9 (1997) (“[T]he 
debates did not focus primarily on Section 1, which today is the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, 
the debates focused on . . . Negro suffrage[,] . . . apportionment and . . . exclusion of rebel leaders 
from office.”). 
 86.  Barry Friedman, This History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: 
Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (2002). 
 87.  A few things about that coalition are worth mentioning. First, labels that are often 
used to classify the Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress—“radical,” “moderate,” and 
“conservative”—are most meaningful for the purposes of lining up membership on the issue of 
black suffrage, but are less useful for classifying membership with respect to other 
Reconstruction questions. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE 
PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 47–48 (1965) (“Disagreeing by varying degrees 
with . . . the moderates, the radical Republicans nevertheless joined them in admitting that a 
constitutional amendment would principally enfranchise the northern Negro.”). Second, any 
assertion about what the coalition intended or what the words it produced meant cannot be 
divorced from the unique historical phenomena driving Congress to recommend the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the states. Third, the Republicans fought extensively over the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but not so much over the content of § 1. See BOND, supra note 85. 
 88.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 89.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Corfield v. Coryell,90 the canonical circuit court decision interpreting 
that Article IV content. 
1. The Comity Clause 
The taut textual string of “privilege,” “immunity,” and 
“citizens” appeared originally in Article IV, and that constitutional 
provision informs the meaning of the PI Clause. Article IV, Section 2, 
Clause 1—styled the “Comity Clause”—provides that “[t]he Citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.” Right off the bat, the Comity Clause 
differs meaningfully from the PI Clause. Article IV features a 
restriction involving “Citizens of each State,” and the Fourteenth 
Amendment addresses the treatment of “citizens of the United 
States.” Article IV deals (perhaps exclusively) with the rights of state 
citizenship, and the Fourteenth Amendment deals with the rights of 
national citizenship. Those two phenomena may intersect 
substantially—a right might be incident to both state and national 
citizenship—although Slaughter-House basically defined that 
intersecting set out of existence.91 
The Comity Clause was and remains subject to multiple 
interpretations. Radical, Moderate, and Conservative Republicans in 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress sat on a spectrum of Article IV 
interpretation, and the features of that spectrum are important pieces 
of the PI Clause puzzle. Most agree that the Comity Clause entitles 
citizens of a state to something; and then the plausible interpretations 
splinter. One might plot the interpretive variation on two axes: (1) the 
meaning of “privileges and immunities,”92 and (2) the degree to which 
 
 90.  6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 91.  See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872) (“[T]he privileges and 
immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citizens of the States as such, 
and that they are left to the State governments for security and protection, and not by this 
article placed under the special care of the Federal government . . . .”).  
 92.  Under one school of thought, “privileges and immunities” referred to all rights under 
state law. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) (“[T]he privileges and immunities 
secured to citizens of each State in the several States, by the provision in question, are those 
privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their 
constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens.”). Under another interpretation, the terms 
included a set of natural rights. See infra Part III.A.2. Under still another, the phrase included 
rights enumerated in the Constitution. See, e.g., Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under 
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 
785, 816 (1982) (“The legal-linguistic history presented here shows that privileges and 
immunities [in Article IV] meant constitutional limitations.”). The important point was that, 
even for interpretations under which the Comity Clause was a nondiscrimination rule, it forbade 
only alienage disability involving “privileges and immunities.” 
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the Comity Clause imposed a rule of nondiscrimination instead of a 
rule of categorical prohibition.93 
Pivotal Republican constituencies responsible for guiding the 
Fourteenth Amendment through Congress generally believed one of 
three things about the Comity Clause: (1) that, as of the Civil War, it 
did protect privileges and immunities of national citizenship;94 (2) that 
it had at one point been intended to protect privileges and immunities 
of national citizenship but had incorrectly been interpreted primarily 
to do other things;95 or (3) that it had never furnished either a 
nondiscrimination or an absolute rule regarding privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship, and that the omission needed to be 
rectified.96 
 
 93.  Some have argued that the Comity Clause was more than a rule of nondiscrimination—
that it prohibited states from imposing even nondiscriminatory restrictions on “privileges and 
immunities.” See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, Paul’s Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1967) (arguing 
that the Comity Clause actually restricted any sovereign interference with natural rights). That 
group would presumably consider “Comity Clause” a misnomer. A subcategory of people 
subscribing to this view of the Comity Clause believed that the privileges and immunities in 
question—for which even nondiscriminatory burdens were impermissible—included rights 
enumerated in the Constitution. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 114–15 (1986) (reciting pedigree of this 
position). 
 94.  Joel Tiffany, who was a lawyer and the reporter for the New York Supreme Court, 
wrote the influential Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery in 1849. In it, he argued that 
state legislation depriving citizens of privileges or immunities was void, a principle that the 
federal judiciary had to enforce. See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 42–44 (“Tiffany concluded that 
slavery was unconstitutional, even in the state. Slaves were citizens.”). Tiffany’s treatise 
influenced a small set of Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress who believed that Article IV 
was more than a rule of nondiscrimination. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the 
States Revisited After Heller, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1445, 1487 (2009) (describing Tiffany’s impact on 
the Heller decision and subsequent Republican views). 
 95.  John Bingham, discussed infra in notes 97–104 and accompanying text, belonged to 
this group. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 182–85 
(1998). In part for this reason, he believed the Fourteenth Amendment—and its grant of 
enforcement powers to Congress in § 5—was necessary to establish that the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 was a lawful exercise of legislative authority. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1093, 
1291 (1866) (“Where is the power in Congress, unless this or some similar amendment be 
adopted, to prevent the reenactment of those infernal [Black Codes.]”); Michael Kent Curtis, 
Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases 
Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
1, 33 (1996): 
Bingham pointed out that Barron held the Bill of Rights amendments did not limit 
the states nor, he insisted, did the Constitution provide for congressional enforcement 
of the Bill of Rights against state action. He insisted that a constitutional amendment 
was needed to allow Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights by passing the Civil Rights 
Bill. 
 96.  See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 114 (“The clause was . . . not intended to control the 
powers of state governments . . . , but simply to ensure that a migrant citizen would enjoy the 
basic rights a state accorded to its own citizens.”). 
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John Bingham, a conservative Ohio Republican who belonged 
to the third group,97 was one of the most influential Republicans in the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress.98 Historian Michael Les Benedict concluded 
that Bingham “led . . . nonradicals in the House” and had “greater 
influence on the course of Reconstruction” than did radical leaders 
such as Thaddeus Stevens.99 Bingham belonged to the hugely powerful 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, charged with reporting the 
Fourteenth Amendment.100 He drafted various iterations of Section 1 
and shepherded the Amendment through the House. Justice Hugo 
Black called Bingham the James Madison of Section 1,101 and 
historians interpreting the Amendment have spent decades 
harvesting Bingham’s speeches and writings for Fourteenth 
Amendment meaning.102 Bingham had stated that the Section 1 
prototype was patterned on Article IV, Section 2.103 He believed, 
however, that the Comity Clause should have been interpreted not 
just as a nondiscrimination rule, but as a categorical protection for 
privileges and immunities of national citizenship.104 Many of 
Bingham’s Republican colleagues agreed with his interpretation. 
Jacob Howard, a Michigan Senator who was also a member of 
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was the Republican point 
 
 97.  See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL 
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, 27 (1974) (listing members of factions in the  
38–40 Congresses). 
 98.  See id. at 31, 36, 57, 143, 162–87 (identifying Bingham as a “Representative[ ] with pre-
eminent influence”). 
 99.  Id. at 36. 
 100.  Id. at 143. 
 101.  See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 73–74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Yet 
Congressman Bingham may, without extravagance, be called the Madison of the first section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 102.  See, e.g., GERARD M. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 334 (2011) [hereinafter Lash, Origins, Part II] (arguing that 
Bingham did not rely on Article IV when drafting the final version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). Several scholars have been critical of Bingham’s intellect and therefore critical of 
arguments that attribute interpretive significance to what he said. See id. at 335 n.23 (showing 
that some scholars were distrustful of Bingham as a source of information). 
 103.  In a debate that took place on February 26, 1866, Congressman Bingham argued that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that he had 
authored protected the same rights found in the text of Article IV, other existing constitutional 
provisions, and the Supremacy Clause. William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" 
Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 171 (2002) (citing 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)). 
 104.  See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 115 (stating that Bingham read Article IV, Section 2 “to 
protect privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, including rights in the Bill of 
Rights, from state interference”). 
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person in the Senate.105 His understanding of Section 1 is particularly 
important because, although technically classified by historians as a 
radical, he commanded the respect of the conservative flank of Senate 
Republicans—probably the conservative bound of the coalition 
necessary to push the Amendment through Congress.106 Howard’s 
reading of the Comity Clause appeared to differ from Bingham’s,107 
but that disagreement was unimportant in light of their shared 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth 
Amendment framers had revised Section 1 to clarify that, no matter 
the proper Comity Clause interpretation, the PI Clause categorically 
protected privileges and immunities incident to a national citizenship 
that the Amendment would formally declare. 
So Bingham, Howard, and their fellow congressional travelers 
understood that the PI Clause protected privileges and immunities of 
national citizenship, and they believed that (at least some) 
enumerated constitutional guarantees qualified.108 Given the virtually 
undisputed understanding that the PI Clause would declare privileges 
and immunities of national citizenship, and bar states from abridging 
them,109 the next logical question involves what those privileges and 
immunities are. More specifically, do they include the habeas 
privilege? Enter Corfield.110 
2. Corfield v. Coryell 
For almost two hundred years, the leading case interpreting 
the meaning of “privileges and immunities” has been Corfield v. 
 
 105.  See Lash, Origins, Part II, supra note 102, at 359. Howard’s Senate responsibility was 
something of an accident. Senator William Fessenden actually helmed the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction—which had developed the Amendment—but Fessenden assigned management 
responsibilities to Howard when Fessenden became ill. See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 184. 
 106.  See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 38 (Henry Wilson and Jacob Howard “had the 
confidence of more conservative Republication Senators and thus had larger impact on 
Reconstruction legislation than their more belligerent allies.”); 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 278 (1927).  
 107.  See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 115 n.162 (stating that Howard may not have accepted 
Bingham’s view). 
 108.  See BERGER, supra note 77, at 38 (providing the Congressmen’s views of the rights that 
would “clothe the Negro”). 
 109.  Although his theory is an outlier, Professor John Harrison has argued—with 
characteristic force and panache—that the PI Clause was simply a rule of nondiscrimination 
forbidding more than distinctions based on alienage. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388 (1992) (“The main point of the clause 
is to require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenshipthe 
same positive law rights of property, contract, and so forthto all of its citizens.”). 
 110.  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
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Coryell,111 an opinion that Justice Bushrod Washington issued while 
riding circuit. New Jersey had prohibited any person that was not an 
“actual inhabitant or resident” from raking oysters in state waters.112 
Corfield claimed that the Comity Clause barred New Jersey from 
discriminating, based on alienage, with respect to oyster-raking 
rights.113 Justice Washington held that an oyster-raking right was not 
covered under the Comity Clause because it was not a privilege or 
immunity of citizens, and in the process he announced a now-famous 
inventory of those concepts.114 (The idea that Corfield distinguished 
between the incidents of state and national citizenship came later.115) 
Justice Washington expressed “no hesitation” in limiting 
privileges and immunities of citizens to those “which are, in their 
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free 
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several states which compose this Union.”116 He then 
lists some members of what I will call the “Corfield inventory”: the 
rights to the protection of government, to the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, to reside anywhere 
and to travel as necessary to work, to have contractual capacities 
honored, to sue in state court, to hold and alienate property, to be 
subject to nondiscriminatory taxation, and a few others.117 Most 
importantly, Justice Washington observed that the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several states included the right “to 
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.”118 
The Corfield inventory was the primary decisional reference 
point for Fourteenth Amendment framers contemplating the meaning 
of “privileges or immunities.”119 Senator Howard, in his remarks on 
the chamber floor, underscored that the PI Clause encompassed the 
privileges and immunities described in Corfield.120 In introducing a 
passage from Corfield, which he read into the Congressional Record, 
Howard stated: 
 
 111.  Id. at 549. 
 112.  Id. at 550. 
 113.  See id. at 551 (“The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states?”). 
 114.  See id. at 551–52. 
 115.  See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Slaughter-House opinion). 
 116.  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
 117.  Id. at 551–52. 
 118.  Id. at 552. 
 119.  See AMAR, supra note 95, at 176 (pointing to Corfield as the “leading comity clause case 
on the books in 1866”). 
 120.  For the record of what Senator Howard said, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2764–65 (1866).  
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But we may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary 
by referring to [Corfield] . . . and I will trouble the Senate but for a moment by reading 
what that very learned and excellent Judge [Washington] says about these privileges 
and immunities of the citizens of each State in the several States.121 
The list of immunities that Howard used Corfield to identify included 
“the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus.”122 The public understood 
Howard’s position; the New York Times reported details of Howard’s 
famous speech on the front page.123 
Other prominent advocates of the Amendment trotted out the 
Corfield inventory whenever they were pressed to explain the 
meaning of Section 1. Senator Lyman Trumbull was the coauthor of 
the Thirteenth Amendment and a pivotal Republican figure in passing 
the Fourteenth. In promoting the Civil Rights Act of 1866,124 Trumbull 
described Justice Washington’s opinion as the “most elaborate upon” 
the meaning of “privileges and immunities,” and he read the Corfield 
inventory—including the reference to the habeas privilege—into the 
Congressional Record.125 Trumbull’s view is particularly important 
because he was a primary exponent of the contemporaneous 
legislation expanding the habeas privilege to reach state custody.126 
James Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, also read 
into the record the Corfield inventory, including the habeas 
privilege.127 Even academics who argue that the PI Clause did not 
apply the Bill to the states make their argument by positioning 
Corfield as the exhaustive list of privileges and immunities incident to 
national citizenship.128 
There was obviously disagreement between Democrats and 
Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, and the Republican 
coalition was more heterogeneous than many treatments of the 
Fourteenth Amendment imply.129 Notwithstanding all of that 
differentiation, virtually everyone in the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
understood (1) that the PI Clause barred some state action with 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. (quoting Corfield). 
 123.  See N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1.  
 124.  Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 125.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Session, 474–75 (1866). 
 126.  See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text (discussing Trumbull’s actions). 
 127.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Session, 1117–18 (1866). 
 128.  See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 77, at 22, 36, 41, 43 (concluding that Corfield and the 
rights secured by the Civil Rights Act were exhaustive of “privileges or immunities” referenced in 
Fourteenth Amendment); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's 
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 673–75 (1979) (concluding that Corfield’s list exhausts the 
definition of “privileges or immunities”). 
 129.  See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 21 (describing the types of Republicans during the 
Reconstruction). 
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respect to privileges and immunities bound to a person’s status as a 
U.S. citizen,130 and (2) that those privileges and immunities included a 
habeas privilege.131 
B. The Minefield of Incorporation Precedent 
Few have given much thought to how contact with the 
Fourteenth Amendment affected the habeas privilege. The oversight 
reflects the interpretive difficulties that the exercise presents. The 
relationship has also been neglected because of the academic capital 
committed to whether and how the Fourteenth Amendment 
“incorporates” the Bill, and the fact that the privilege is a right not 
enumerated there. 
As all law students learn, the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
two potential devices for incorporating rights against the states: the 
PI Clause and the DP Clause. The Supreme Court threw an early 
wrench into incorporation, snuffing the PI Clause in Slaughter-
House.132 As a result, most incorporation has been left to the DP 
Clause.133 The meaning of each Clause has been warped around how 
programmatically it applies the Bill against the states and how much 
discretion it affords Justices to develop unenumerated rights. The 
thrust and parry of incorporation combat is well known,134 as are the 
 
 130.  See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the original meaning of the Comity Clause). 
 131.  See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Corfield case). 
 132.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 133.  See CURTIS, supra note 93, at 171–96 (discussing how the courts viewed incorporation). 
 134.  Basically, the Supreme Court deployed the Due Process Clause to do the incorporation 
work that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had probably intended for the PI Clause. 
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the PI clause after Slaughter-House). Different Justices became 
associated with each of three different incorporation paradigms. Justice Black was a champion of 
“total” or “mechanical” incorporation, which embraced the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to incorporate the first eight Amendments in the Bill, and nothing else. See Betts 
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–75 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Sixth 
Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 
68–123 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is incorporated by 
the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Frankfurter advocated more fluid use of the Due Process 
Clause to force states to observe rights that are principles of fundamental fairness and implicit 
in ordered liberty. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 59–68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring):  
Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes 
upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in 
order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which 
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged 
with the most heinous offenses. 
Justice Brennan charted a middle ground frequently described as “selective incorporation,” in 
which the Supreme Court determines, clause-by-clause, whether rights enumerated in the Bill 
were sufficiently fundamental to be applied against the states via the Due Process Clause. See 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the “Fifth Amendment's exception from 
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combatants.135 Although some discussion of incorporation is 
appropriate, I forego unnecessary detail and note simply that 
“incorporation mechanics” refers to two-step Fourteenth Amendment 
theories in which (1) a right is identified and (2) state action impairing 
it is prohibited. 
The strength of my account is largely unaffected by one’s view 
of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation mechanics, for two reasons. 
First, even after Slaughter-House, precedent leaves no doubt that the 
habeas privilege is one of the few “privilege[s] or immunit[ies] of [U.S.] 
citizens” covered by the PI Clause. Second, my account does not really 
involve the second mechanical step of incorporation at all. The PI 
Clause declared a habeas privilege of national citizenship that is 
enforceable against the federal government, a function that is 
independent of how the Amendment activated rights against the 
states. 
1. How Slaughter-House Marginalized the PI Clause 
Slaughter-House is the big reason why so many overlook the 
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the habeas privilege. In 
Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court disabled the PI Clause by paring 
the covered privileges and immunities down to a thin sliver.136 As it 
turns out, a signal virtue of my account is that the habeas privilege 
still occupies that real estate. 
 
compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against 
abridgment by the States.”); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154–60 (1961) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is incorporated by the Fourteenth); Ohio ex 
rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274–76 (1960) (discussing the different views on what the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates). 
 135.  The generative academic event was Justice Black’s dissent in Adamson, which three 
other Justices joined. Justice Black argued at length that the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose 
was to incorporate, almost exclusively, the privileges and immunities enumerated in the Bill. See 
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68–123 (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment is 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Black’s Adamson dissent provoked a 
snarling 139-page response by Professor Charles Fairman. See Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. 
REV. 5, 5 (1949). Professor William Crosskey was the first major academic defender of Justice 
Black and critic of Professor Fairman. See 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1083–175, 1381 n.11 (1953); William 
Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on 
State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–119 (1954). Justice Black’s dissent and Professor 
Fairman’s article have become elemental subjects for subsequent generations of influential 
incorporation scholars. See Amar, supra note 35, at 1194 (naming a few of these scholars, 
including Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William Brennan, Henry Friendly, William Crosskey, 
Louis Henkin, Erwin Griswold, and John Ely).  
 136.  See infra notes 140–49 and accompanying text. 
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Courts have largely interpreted the Article IV Comity Clause 
as a rule of nondiscrimination: states could not impose alienage 
disability with respect to privileges and immunities.137 The PI Clause, 
on the other hand, was an absolute limit on government power to 
impair privileges or immunities of citizens, even if the impairment 
was nondiscriminatory.138 Slaughter-House held that there was 
another salient distinction between the Comity and PI Clauses: that 
between rights of state citizenship and rights of national 
citizenship.139 
The Slaughter-House Cases were six consolidated appeals.140 
Each involved the same Louisiana charter granting an exclusive 
privilege to butcher livestock around New Orleans.141 The cases 
collectively presented the question whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment created an individual right to challenge a state-created 
monopoly—and, more abstractly, what kinds of individual rights the 
Amendment recognized as “privileges or immunities” enforceable 
against the states.142 
The Supreme Court’s answer was “not many.” Slaughter-House 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment merely barred States from 
abridging privileges or immunities incident to national citizenship.143 
The list of national privileges and immunities is thin: to travel to the 
seat of government, to petition the federal government to redress 
grievances, to transact with it, to travel within the states, to access 
seaports, and a few others.144 Slaughter-House held that the PI Clause 
did not bar the States from abridging privileges and immunities 
incident to state citizenship,145 which are subject only to the Comity 
Clause’s nondiscrimination rule. 
Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion is logically 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, privileges and immunities 
 
 137.  See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People's Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the 
Constitution's Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1954 n.68 (2012) (“The clause 
has long been understood to mean that states cannot discriminate on the basis of an American 
citizen's state citizenship.”). 
 138.  But cf. Harrison, supra note 109, at 1388 (arguing that PI Clause should be read as a 
nondiscrimination rule). 
 139.  See infra notes 140–49 and accompanying text. For a defense of this distinction, see 
Lash, Origins, Part II, supra note 102, at 336–37. 
 140.  See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (caption). 
 141.  See id. at 59 (discussing the Louisiana charter). 
 142.  See id. at 72–73. 
 143.  See id. at 73–74. 
 144.  Id. at 79–80. 
 145.  See id. at 74 (“It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, 
and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different 
characteristics or circumstances in the individual.”). 
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of state citizenship might also be privileges and immunities of 
national citizenship.146 Second, the Corfield inventory reads far more 
naturally as a set of rights incident to citizenship generally than it 
does as a set incident only to state citizenship.147 Third, Justice 
Miller’s textual analysis treated “privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States” as tantamount to “privileges or immunities 
unique to national citizenship.” Fourth, any distinct set of national 
privileges and immunities is much broader than Justice Miller defined 
it.148 Finally, the opinion seemed to ignore the basic structural 
changes wrought by the Civil War and Reconstruction.149 Whatever 
combination of misgivings one might have about Slaughter-House, 
though, it has not been overruled. As a result, the PI Clause remains 
largely unavailable to litigants seeking to enforce most individual 
rights against the States. 
Despite the pronounced Supreme Court division in Slaughter-
House—four Justices generated three different dissents—the one 
thing upon which all Justices seemed to agree was that the habeas 
guarantee reflected in the Suspension Clause was a privilege of 
national citizenship. The majority’s primary objective was to exclude 
the ability to challenge a slaughter-house monopoly from the bundle of 
privileges and immunities incident to national citizenship. And in 
order to show that the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship was not a null set, Justice Miller listed several examples—
including the “privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.”150 He also 
 
 146.  See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 646–48 (1994) (“Many of 
the same rights are protected by both the state and the federal constitutions.”). 
 147.  Justice Miller accomplished this feat by misquoting the Comity Clause. He 
paraphrased it as relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens “of the several States,” but 
the Comity clause involves the privileges and immunities of citizens “in the several States.” See 
LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT?: A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO REVISE 
THE CONSTITUTION 194–95 (1975) (explaining how Justice Miller’s opinion misquotes the 
Constitution). 
 148.  See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that, if the PI Clause “only refers . . . to such privileges and immunities as were before 
its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to 
citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and 
most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.”). 
 149.  See Walter Dellinger, Remarks on Jeffrey Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 
1294 (1998): 
The more fundamental error of Slaughter-House was its failure fully to recognize that 
the nation fought a great Civil War and in its aftermath changed the fundamental law 
of the republic. Slaughter-House erred by resurrecting antebellum presuppositions of 
state primacy and state autonomy that had been the justifications of the Confederacy. 
That mistake dwarfs . . . any concern about which clause the Court got wrong. 
 150.  Id. at 79. 
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described the privilege as a “right[ ] of the citizen guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution.”151 
Justice Field dissented and was joined by all other dissenters: 
Justices Swayne and Bradley, as well as Chief Justice Chase. For 
these dissenters, the PI Clause did not refer merely to privileges and 
immunities of national citizens qua national citizenship, but to 
privileges and immunities that “of right belong to the citizens of all 
free governments.”152 They believed that the PI Clause reached a 
bundle of privileges and immunities at least as broad as the Corfield 
inventory. And among those privileges and immunities mentioned by 
Justice Washington in Corfield was the right to “claim the benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus.”153  
There were two other dissenting opinions. Justice Bradley 
wrote to underscore the idea that rights of state and national 
citizenship were identical, and that one “of these rights was that of 
habeas corpus, or the right of having any invasion of personal liberty 
judicially examined into, at once, by a competent judicial 
magistrate.”154 Justice Bradley also quoted the Corfield excerpt 
explicitly mentioning habeas corpus.155 Justice Swayne’s dissent was 
more cryptic,156 but he joined the dissents of both Justices Field and 
Bradley.157 Ultimately, the Justices in Slaughter-House did not agree 
on much, but the proposition that the PI Clause included the habeas 
privilege commanded unanimous support. 
2. The PI Clause after Slaughter-House 
Slaughter-House announced that the rights associated with 
state and national citizenship were distinct, and the habeas privilege 
 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 153.  To add insult to injury, worth mentioning is that, if Justice Miller were correct and 
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment were talking about privileges and immunities of 
distinct types of citizenship, then habeas probably should not appear on both lists. The fact that 
it does suggests that Justice Miller erred. 
 154.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 115 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 155.  Id. at 117 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 546 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)). 
 156.  Justice Swayne stated that the “citizen of a State has the same fundamental rights as a 
citizen of the United States, and also certain others . . . arising from his relation to the 
State . . . .” Id. at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting). He then remarked that there “may thus be a 
double citizenship, each having some rights peculiar to itself.” Id. (Swayne, J., dissenting). Both 
statements cannot be true. If state citizenship carries all the rights of national citizenship, then 
the proposition in the second sentence—that there might be some rights of national citizenship 
that are not rights of state citizenship—cannot be true. 
 157.  Id. at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
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remained in the latter category.158 Even after the Slaughter-House 
mischief became a fully realized obstacle to incorporation, however, 
the PI Clause’s relationship to the habeas privilege survived intact. 
Three years after Slaughter-House, in United States v. Cruikshank, 
the Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between citizenship 
types: “The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the 
United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship 
under one of these governments will be different from those he has 
under the other.”159 Following Slaughter-House and Cruikshank, the 
Court declined a slew of opportunities to use the PI Clause to 
incorporate features of the Bill against the states.160 The Supreme 
Court gestured towards the PI Clause’s role in incorporating rights of 
national citizenship but refused to include various express 
constitutional guarantees in that category. (I address the role of the 
DP Clause in incorporation mechanics in Section III.C0) 
Amongst those who envisioned a more robust role for the PI 
Clause—call them Slaughter-House contrarians161—the habeas 
privilege also remained central. In Ex parte Spies (also known as The 
Anarchists’ Case),162 well-known attorney and politician John 
Randolph Tucker made a celebrated argument in favor of 
incorporation under the PI Clause.163 In that case, he argued that 
rights preexisting the Constitution (1) became privileges and 
immunities of citizens by enumeration in the original Constitution or 
the Bill, and (2) ran against the states by operation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.164 Included in the list of the declared privileges, 
according to Tucker, was the “security for habeas corpus.”165 A half 
decade later, Justice Field expressly relied on Tucker’s reasoning 
 
 158.  See id. at 74. 
 159.  92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875). 
 160.  See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96–99 (1908) (Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602–05 (1900) (Fifth Amendment 
right to criminal prosecution under indictment and Sixth Amendment right to criminal trial by 
jury); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448–49 (1890) (Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual 
punishment” clause); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1886) (Second Amendment right 
to bear arms); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 90 (1875) (Seventh Amendment jury-trial right in 
civil cases). 
 161.  This is a nod to Professor Akhil Amar, who coined the term “Barron contrarians” to 
describe those who thought that the Supreme Court wrongly decided Barron v. Baltimore, 32 
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), and that the Bill applied to the states of its own force. Amar, supra note 
35, at 1203. 
 162.  The Anarchists’ Case, 123 U.S. 131, 151 (1887) (citing the oral argument). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
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when he dissented in O’Neil v. Vermont,166 the case in which the Court 
formally considered whether the PI Clause incorporated parts of the 
Bill.167 Justice Field’s O’Neil dissent, in turn, became a staple of 
Slaughter-House contrarianism.168 Justice Harlan, who had joined 
Justice Field in O’Neil, continued to champion incorporation under the 
PI Clause. He dissented in Maxwell v. Dow,169 a case in which the 
Court refused to apply grand and petit jury guarantees against the 
states, and in Twining v. New Jersey,170 a case in which the Court 
refused to incorporate the Fifth Amendment rule against self-
incrimination. The Twining majority expressly associated Justice 
Harlan’s PI Clause position with that offered in Justice Field’s O’Neil 
dissent. 
The most famous Slaughter-House contrarian is Justice Hugo 
Black. His Adamson v. California dissent remains the contrarians’ 
pièce de résistance.171 Justice Black’s objective was twofold: (1) to 
establish that the Fourteenth Amendment framers intended the PI 
Clause as a vehicle of incorporation, and (2) to undermine the 
discretion that the Justices enjoyed under the ascendant DP Clause 
incorporation paradigm.172 Having accepted that the DP Clause would 
be the vehicle declaring the pertinent rights, Justice Black sought to 
cabin judicial discretion by reference to limits native to the PI Clause. 
Justice Black’s preferred incorporation method is sometimes 
called “mechanical,” to signify that it applies only the Bill, in its 
entirety,173 to the states. The label is misleading in at least one 
respect: for Justice Black, the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship encompassed a little more than the rights enumerated in 
the Bill. He concurred with a Justice Douglas dissent arguing that the 
PI Clause covered interstate travel, seemingly on the ground that it 
 
 166.  144 U.S. 323, 361 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 167.  Id. at 361 (Field, J., dissenting) (“I think the definition given at one time before this 
court by [Tucker] is correct, that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
are such as have their recognition in or guaranty from the constitution of the United States.” 
(citing The Anarchists’ Case, 123 U.S. at 150)). 
 168.  Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98 (citing O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 361 (Field, J., 
dissenting)). 
 169.  176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900). 
 170.  Twining, 211 U.S. at 114. 
 171.  332 U.S. 46, 68–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 172.  See HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 23–42 (1968). 
 173.  Technically, Justice Black only believed that the Fourteenth Amendment was capable 
of incorporating the first eight Amendments, as the Ninth and Tenth could not be the logical 
operand of an incorporation function. Amar, supra note 35, at 1227. 
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was one of the rights specified in Slaughter-House.174 Justice Black’s 
later opinions indicate that he thought the PI Clause encompassed the 
rights enumerated in the Bill and the rights specified in Slaughter-
House, but not the natural rights in the Corfield inventory.175 That 
information is significant because the habeas privilege was an 
enumerated right that Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion 
brought within the scope of the PI Clause. To the extent that Justice 
Black was concerned with limiting judicial discretion, the idea that 
the PI Clause included the habeas privilege would have been 
unproblematic because the privilege was enumerated in the 
Constitution. 
Justice Thomas is the leading Slaughter-House contrarian on 
the modern Supreme Court. In what could turn out to be an important 
footnote to his PI Clause concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
the Second Amendment incorporation case,176 he wrote: 
I see no reason to assume that the constitutionally enumerated rights protected by the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause should consist of all the rights recognized in the Bill of 
Rights and no others. Constitutional provisions outside the Bill of Rights protect 
individual rights, see, e.g., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (granting the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus”), and there is no obvious evidence that the Framers of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause meant to exclude them.177 
So Justice Thomas believes that the PI Clause refers to, among other 
things, the habeas privilege. Guessing what Justice Thomas thinks 
such incorporation entails is not easy, however, in part because he 
mischaracterizes the Suspension Clause as “granting” the privilege.178 
I will discuss the declared privilege’s scope in Part IV, but first I want 
to address a superficially similar account, based on the DP Clause, in 
which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a federal habeas forum 
to state prisoners. 
 
 174.  See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 168–80 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The 
right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by the 
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference.”). 
 175.  See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 261 n.41 
(1982) (“[Justice Black’s] later opinions suggest that, apart from the Bill of Rights guarantees, he 
would have included only the rights relating directly to the Slaughter-House view of privileges 
and immunities—that is, rights that owe their existence to the federal government, federal 
constitution, or federal laws.”). 
 176.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 (2010). 
 177.  Id. at 3084 n.20 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 178.  As explained in Part II.A, the Suspension Clause doesn’t “grant” anything; it 
announces restrictions on a suspension power. The power to suspend and the privilege on which 
it operates originate from somewhere other than the Suspension Clause itself. I strongly suspect 
that somewhere in the details lies a dispute with Justice Thomas over what I believe the 
constitutional privilege entails, but not with the fact that the PI Clause covers it. 
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C. Incorporating the Privilege Under the DP Clause 
Before reaching the status of a state-prisoner privilege under 
the PI Clause, it is worth asking whether an account based on the DP 
Clause and using traditional incorporation mechanics could get to the 
same place. It can’t. Professor Jordan Steiker has developed the best 
version of the DP Clause account.179 Pursuant to selective 
incorporation, the DP Clause incorporates “fundamental” rights 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and deeply rooted in our 
nation’s history and traditions.180 On Professor Steiker’s account, the 
DP Clause guaranteed a federal habeas forum to state prisoners 
because, by 1868, that privilege met the selective-incorporation 
criteria.181 Professor Steiker relies heavily on Professor Akhil Amar’s 
theory of “refined incorporation.”182 According to Professor Amar, 
individual rights behave differently depending on whether they 
restrain the federal government (as specified in the original 
Constitution or the Bill) or whether they restrain the states (as 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment).183 
Professor Steiker’s account differs markedly from mine, most 
notably because he rejects the possibility that contact with the PI 
Clause could be the source of a federal privilege to challenge state 
custody.184 A DP Clause account has other complications, however: it 
requires an argument that a state-prisoner privilege was historically 
 
 179.  See Steiker, supra note 4, at 899 (“In light of the Court’s ‘incorporation’ decisions, the 
courts should recognize the privilege of habeas corpus protected by the Suspension Clause as a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right.”). Professor Michael O’Connor wrote an article 
arguing that the PI Clause entitles state prisoners to a federal forum when they are incarcerated 
on account of race. See O’Connor, supra note 71, at 666 (“The Privileges or Immunities Clause 
was intended to constitutionalize federal habeas corpus review of any state attempts to deprive 
an individual of liberty based upon race.”). Professor O’Connor is more comfortable relying on PI 
Clause contact than is Professor Steiker, but on his account, the privilege translates ultimately 
only into a limited constitutional guarantee against racially biased custody. O’Connor, supra 
note 71, at 660. That limit is premised on a flawed reading of the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act’s 
legislative history. Compare O’Connor, supra note 71, at 686–87 (“While the language of the act 
would change, its purpose to enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the 
constitutional amendment abolishing slavery, would remain unchanged.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), with supra Part IV.B.4. Moreover, Professor O’Connor does not explain why PI 
Clause contact would restrict federal action, and he relies on traditional incorporation 
mechanics. O’Connor, supra note 71, at 718–19. 
 180.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quotations omitted). 
 181.  Steiker, supra note 4, at 869–70. 
 182.  Id. at 869. 
 183.  Amar, supra note 35, at 1264–66. 
 184.  Professor Steiker occasionally invokes the text of the PI Clause as supporting the spirit 
of Due Process incorporation, but he believes that the PI Clause cannot do the work. Steiker, 
supra note 4, at 869.  
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fundamental, and it struggles to show how the Fourteenth 
Amendment produced a restriction on the federal government. An 
account of the same privilege based on the PI Clause avoids these 
issues. 
1. A Note on Terminology: The Incorporated Object 
Too much is made of incorporating the Suspension Clause. 
Professor Steiker’s titular question is whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Suspension Clause,185 but the 
incorporated phenomenon is the habeas privilege. The Suspension 
Clause references that privilege, but the Suspension Clause itself is 
nothing more than a limit on suspension power. Habeas power was an 
incident of the habeas privilege, which is defined largely by 
corresponding judicial power over categories of custodians.186 If 
“creation” of the privilege must be attributed to any string of 
constitutional text, then the strongest candidate is Article III, not the 
Suspension Clause.187 And if Article III secures a constitutionally 
guaranteed habeas privilege, then the more generally applicable 
principle that Congress can electively vest Article III judicial power 
does not apply to habeas jurisdiction.188 
Also, Framers of the original Constitution were legal 
naturalists: they believed that rights preexisted acts of textual 
declaration.189 When people write about incorporating something that 
the Suspension Clause “created,” they are reading the original 
Constitution—a document written by legal naturalists—through 
positivist lenses. Analyzing Fourteenth Amendment contact with the 
Suspension Clause, rather than Fourteenth Amendment contact with 
the habeas privilege that the Suspension Clause recognizes, produces 
answers to the wrong questions. No function that the Suspension 
Clause actually performs is involved in an account of what happens 
when processing the privilege through the PI Clause. 
The mistaken attribution is more than a semantic issue. If the 
corollary of the habeas privilege is Article III judicial power, then the 
implications of guaranteeing the privilege to a new category of 
 
 185.  Id. at 862. 
 186.  See supra Part II.A (introducing the habeas privilege) 
 187.  Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 754, 774–78. 
 188.  See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power To Control the 
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 
45, 46–47 (1975) (stating the general rule). 
 189.  See generally AMAR, supra note 95, at 147–56 (describing how declaratory theory 
influenced the development of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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prisoners change. Habeas Power explained that a prisoner’s habeas 
privilege corresponds to federal habeas power, the vesting of which is 
mandatory, over that prisoner’s custodian.190 If the Constitution 
guarantees a habeas privilege reaching state custodians, then that 
privilege necessarily means that Congress cannot strip the 
corresponding judicial power to discharge state prisoners. 
2. The Vehicle of Incorporation 
An account based on the DP Clause suffers from some of the 
more general problems afflicting selective incorporation: the absence 
of Framers’ intent,191 no textual anchor,192 adherence to an open-ended 
incorporation methodology,193 and the subjectivity involved in 
declaring a “privilege” sufficiently fundamental to qualify for due 
process enforcement at all.194 That ground is well traversed, and I will 
not cross it much here. 
Recall specifically the test for an incorporated right: whether it 
is a necessary feature of “ordered liberty,” and whether it is 
“fundamental” because it is a “principle of justice [deeply] rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people”195 Although the Anglo-
American role of the habeas writ is difficult to overstate, the privilege 
did not manifest in general federal power to review state custody for 
the first eight decades of American history. That state of affairs 
creates different problems depending on one’s preferred approach to 
constitutional interpretation. If one is an originalist who measures 
from 1868 the extent to which a right is fundamental, then defenders 
of a DP Clause theory must establish that American tradition 
encompassed a broad right to contest state custody even though 
 
 190.  See Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 774–78 (discussing a conceptualization of the habeas 
privilege as a corollary of Article III judicial power). 
 191.  See Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 
74, 77–78 (1982) (“There is no evidence, and it is difficult to conceive, that anyone thought or 
intended that the amendment should impose on the states a selective incorporation. In the 
absence of any special intention revealed in the history of the amendment, we have only the 
language to look to.”). 
 192.  See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of the 
Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1526 (2000) (calling the theory of selective incorporation 
“textually untenable”). 
 193.  See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION 161 (1994). 
 194.  See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I 
Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1560 (1996) (“While fundamental 
fairness nominally incorporates most of the procedures set out in the Bill of Rights, the Court 
has qualified those procedures according to ad hoc balances of competing interests.”). 
 195.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quotation marks omitted). 
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Congress did not provide for it until 1867.196 Or, if one is not an 
originalist and believes that Justices can rank a right as fundamental 
even if it was not so viewed in 1868, then the argument slips back into 
the most severe problems associated with the absence of authoritative 
legal sourcing. 
3. State Action and Incorporation 
The most significant problem with traditional incorporation—
irrespective of the vehicle—is that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a prohibition on state action: “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
Citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”197 The 
problem with an account in which the DP Clause incorporates the 
habeas privilege is its attempt to support a constitutional restriction 
on the federal government. This problem is probably the reason why 
Professor Steiker refers to incorporation as the “more circuitous” route 
to a privilege with Type 2 features.198 
Recall our diagram from Part II.B. Figure 2 presents a slightly 
modified diagram of habeas privilege configurations. Any Fourteenth 
Amendment account should be assessed by how effectively it justifies 
adding Type 2 privilege features to the preexisting Type 1 guarantee. 
 
Figure 2: Fourteenth Amendment Accounts 
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(1) federal privilege to 
contest federal custody 
(original Constitution) 
 
(2) federal privilege to contest 
state custody 
(Kovarsky: PI Clause; Steiker: 
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Privilege 
 
(3) state privilege to contest 
federal custody 
 
 
(4) state privilege to contest 
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 196.  The earlier provisions creating habeas power to relieve state custody were very limited. 
The 1833 Force Act created a habeas remedy for federal officials in state custody for performing 
official duties, and the 1842 Force Act created a remedy for foreign-state representatives acting 
in their official capacities. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842); Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634 (1833). 
 197.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 198.  Steiker, supra note 4, at 867. 
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As Section IV.B will explain, the proposition that Fourteenth 
Amendment contact results in a state habeas privilege is implausible 
in light of the intent and structure of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.199 
Traditional incorporation mechanics do not adequately explain 
how the Fourteenth Amendment added Type 2 features to the 
preexisting habeas guarantee. If the Fourteenth Amendment truly 
incorporates the habeas privilege against the states, then either “no 
state shall make or enforce any law” abridging it (the PI Clause 
version), or a state unconstitutionally takes “life, liberty, or property” 
by violating it (the DP Clause version). In either formulation, a habeas 
privilege processed using traditional incorporation mechanics 
generates hiccups: privileges with Type 3 and 4 features. The existing 
DP Clause incorporation model is at its weakest in explaining how it 
avoids that implausible result. 
The DP Clause account basically relies on structure and 
purpose to dominate a textually expressed limit on state action.200 
Professor Amar’s theory of refined incorporation provides a deeply 
satisfying account of how individual rights might change when they 
are incorporated against the states, but it does not alter the way we 
understand the words “no State shall . . . abridge” and “nor shall any 
State . . . deny.”201 For the federal habeas privilege, even the best DP 
Clause incorporation account still struggles against the Clause’s text. 
D. The Habeas Privilege Consensus 
Now consider what I call the declarative function of the PI 
Clause. Combining the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment with content of the first yields a federal privilege to 
contest state custody that is consistent with both the PI Clause’s text 
and the more general structure and purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Section 1’s first two sentences together declare national 
citizenship and the bundle of rights it entails. By definition, the 
federal government may not abridge that newly declared bundle of 
rights. Under my account, there is simply no need to develop a 
 
 199.  Professor Steiker realized this problem. See id. at 894 (“The difficulty in reconstructing 
the privilege of habeas corpus in this way is that it runs contrary to the Reconstruction 
Congress’s apparent belief that recourse to the state courts would not adequately ensure 
enforcement of the newly established rights.”). 
 200.  See id. at 899 (“On the other hand, though, the text does not support, and in fact 
undermines, the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a right to federal habeas 
corpus. Accordingly, the case for constitutionalizing such federal review must be based on other 
considerations.”). 
 201.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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complex theory explaining why the absence of a federal habeas forum 
constitutes state abridgment (PI Clause) or deprivation (DP Clause). 
The PI Clause inspires many interpretive disagreements, 
including the meaning of “privileges” and “immunities,” as well as the 
extent to which state action is restricted. One of the few Fourteenth 
Amendment propositions that should provoke no interpretive 
resistance, however, is that the PI Clause declares the habeas 
privilege to be a right of national citizenship.202 That conclusion is 
perhaps most easily drawn for textualists—habeas is the only 
entitlement denominated as a privilege in the Articles of Constitution 
or the Bill. The proposition also works well in an originalist idiom, 
whether focused on intent or understanding. Perhaps most 
importantly, the proposition’s acceptability does not differ depending 
on whether one is a Slaughter-House enthusiast or contrarian. As I 
explained in my introduction to Part III, my account does not require 
readers to declare allegiances in pitched battles over interpretive 
methods. 
IV. A PRIVILEGE OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP TO CHALLENGE  
STATE CUSTODY 
In Part IV, I work from a premise established in Part III: 
virtually all authority recognizes that the PI Clause does something to 
the habeas privilege. But what does it do? What features of the habeas 
privilege does the PI Clause constitutionalize? The best interpretation 
is that the PI Clause entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas 
forum, thereby adding Type 2 features to the original constitutional 
guarantee. Congress submitted Fourteenth Amendment at the same 
time as it enacted the nation’s most important change in habeas 
privilege: the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The Act extended the 
federal privilege to reach state custody. The PI Clause declared that 
version of the habeas guarantee to be an incident of national 
citizenship. If habeas power over state custodians is constitutionally 
inviolable, then federal courts must revisit basic questions about the 
modern structure of postconviction review for state prisoners. 
In Part IV, I want to distinguish two concepts that observers 
frequently conflate. In short, the first-order issue of whether habeas 
power reaches state custody is distinct from the second-order issue of 
whether such power permits federal review of a state criminal 
 
 202.  In his seminal work on the Bill and incorporation, Professor Amar repeatedly identifies 
the privilege as a Fourteenth Amendment referent. AMAR, supra note 95, at 175, 179, 211, 219, 
227, 297. 
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conviction. In state-prisoner cases, those questions often appear in 
tandem, because criminal convictions are the primary (but not 
exclusive) form of custody exercised by states.203 Sections IV.A and 
IV.B focus on the state-custody question. Section IV.C reaches some 
preliminary conclusions about the postconviction question, but the 
habeas privilege belonging to criminally confined state prisoners 
deserves comprehensive treatment in another Article. 
A. Rejecting the State-Privilege Products 
Before analyzing the federal privilege that the PI Clause 
secures, I want to deal briefly with the state-privilege possibilities. 
Whatever power corresponds to an expanded privilege, that power is 
federal. The PI Clause, that is, does not entitle prisoners to a state 
habeas forum. Consider once again our familiar matrix, slightly 
modified to preview the content of this Part: 
 
Figure 3: New Features of Privilege 
  
Federal Custody 
 
State Custody 
 
Federal 
Privilege 
 
(1) federal privilege for 
federal custody (disqualified 
under Section IV.B.1) 
 
 
(2) federal privilege for state 
custody (created by PI Clause 
contact, Sections IV.B.2 to 
IV.B.5) 
 
 
State 
Privilege 
 
(3) state privilege for federal 
custody (disqualified under 
Section IV.A.1) 
 
 
(4) state privilege for state 
custody (disqualified under 
Section IV.A.2) 
 
Here, I argue that the PI Clause added Type 2 features to the 
original Constitution’s Type 1 guarantee. First, though, I devote Part 
IV.A to the implausibility of accounts in which the Civil War 
amendments produced a constitutional guarantee for Privilege Types 
3 and 4, both of which involve state judicial power. The PI Clause did 
not transform the federal habeas guarantee into a state privilege any 
more than the DP Clause converted the First Amendment into a state 
right. 
 
 203.  For example, habeas process is used to review civil custody such as pretrial detention, 
mental health commitment, quarantines, and restrictions on sexual predators. See, e.g., Seling v. 
Young, 531 U.S. 250, 253–56 (2001) (reviewing Washington state statute for civilly committing 
“sexually violent predators”). 
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1. A Type 3 State Privilege for Federal Prisoners 
This one is easy. If Reconstruction was designed to force the 
rebellious states to swallow federal supremacy as the price of 
restoration, then the Fourteenth Amendment does not empower state 
judges to void federal custody. In Tarble’s Case,204 moreover, the 
Supreme Court held that a Type 3 privilege was unconstitutional. In 
fact, even if Tarble had broken the other way, the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not have been the reason. The argument in favor of 
a Type 3 privilege is predicated on the intent of the 1789 Framers and 
common practice during the early years of the republic—not some 
subsequent constitutional event.205 Thus, contact with the PI Clause 
did not guarantee a state forum to contest federal custody. 
2. A Type 4 State Privilege for State Prisoners 
Privilege Type 4 is slightly more difficult to dismiss. A 
PI Clause–created state privilege to contest state custody is a more 
plausible outcome than is a PI Clause–created state privilege to 
challenge federal custody. No less a figure than Professor William 
Crosskey, the earliest academic ally of Justice Black, appears to have 
taken this view.206 Its pedigree notwithstanding,207 the proposition 
breaks down under the microscope. 
First, in the abstract, there was no need to secure a state 
habeas privilege. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 
 
 204.  80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). 
 205.  See supra note 52 (collecting authority explaining argument that the constitution did 
permit state habeas review of federal custody). This argument has been accomplished by reading 
Tarble’s Case as setting forth a rule of federal preemption rather than a rule of categorical 
prohibition. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 43, at 64 n.17 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 437–39 (6th ed. 2009)) 
(arguing that reading Tarble’s Case as a broad constitutional rule about exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over the writ of habeas corpus, rather than only as a statutory preemption rule 
precluding states from granting the writ to a petitioner in federal custody, would “run afoul of 
basic concepts of the role of the state courts in enforcing federal, and especially constitutional, 
rights”); see also Amar, supra note 43, at 1510 (contending that Booth and Tarble should be read 
as “attributing to Congress a desire for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings 
against federal officers”). 
 206.  See CROSSKEY, supra note 135, at 1129 (reading Fourteenth Amendment contact to 
show that “the guaranty against suspension [of the writ is] now operative against the states in 
their own courts”). 
 207.  Professor Amar also seemed to endorse this understanding. See Amar, supra note 35, at 
1258 (citing CROSSKEY, supra note 135, at 1128–30) (stating that Justice Miller, in his 
Slaughter-House opinion, “had in mind only state interference with efforts to assemble and 
petition the federal government, and to secure habeas relief on the basis of federal laws in federal 
courts”). 
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almost every state already guaranteed one, in some form or another.208 
In 1787, four of the twelve states with written constitutions provided 
habeas guarantees.209 True, some early state constitutions omitted 
habeas language, but that was only because nobody questioned that 
citizens had a state privilege.210 
By the Civil War, formal state commitment to habeas 
privileges was even more pronounced. Except for Vermont, every state 
admitted to the Union since 1787 had a written constitutional 
provision resembling the federal Suspension Clause.211 Vermont had a 
habeas provision, but it provided that the privilege should never be 
suspended.212 Furthermore, six of the nine original states that lacked 
written habeas guarantees eventually enacted state constitutional 
provisions providing them.213 
The states prolifically used the common-law writ,214 so 
legislation was unnecessary.215 Using state habeas statutes to 
supplement common-law process was old hat; such was the 
relationship between the English common-law writ and the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1679.216 The state privilege was largely useless to slaves 
and abolitionists before the Civil War—and to freedmen and southern 
 
 208.  See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 
249 (1965) (“All twenty-one of the new states admitted after 1787 and prior to 1860, with the sole 
exception of Vermont, wrote into their constitutions a habeas corpus provision practically (and in 
most cases exactly) identical to the federal provision.”). 
 209.  GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LX; MASS. CONST. ch. 6, art. VII (1780); N.C. CONST. of 1776, 
art XII; N.H. CONST. (unnumbered provision) (1784). 
 210.  See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 
B.U. L. REV. 143, 146 (1952) 
 211.  ALA. CONST. art I, § 17 (1819); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art II, § 18; CAL. CONST. of 1849, 
art I, § 5; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 13; IND. CONST. of 
1816, art. I, § 14; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. of 1855, art. I, § 8; KY. CONST. of 
1792, art. XII, § 16; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. 6, § 19; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1820); MICH. CONST. 
of 1835, art. I, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1857); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 17; MO. 
CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 11; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 12; OR. CONST. art. I, § 23 
(1857); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 15; TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8 (1848). 
 212.  VT. CONST. art. XII (1836). 
 213.  CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 14; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 13; GA. CONST. of 1798, 
art. IV, § 9; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 11; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 6; PA. CONST. of 
1790, art. IX, § 14; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 9. In other words, when the Civil War started, 
only Maryland and South Carolina lacked express constitutional habeas provisions. And both of 
those states added habeas provisions to their constitutions as the Fourteenth Amendment was 
being ratified. Md. CONST. art. III, § 55 (1867); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 17. 
 214.  See Oaks, supra note 208, at 287–88 (“[T]he availability of the writ [of habeas corpus] 
for many types of restraints—differing from state to state—remained under the authority of the 
common law.”). 
 215.  State habeas statutes were not prevalent until well into nineteenth century. See id. at 
251–52. 
 216.  Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.). 
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loyalists after it—but the Equal Protection Clause was the Fourteenth 
Amendment text addressed to that problem.217 
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prisoners 
have no constitutional right to postconviction review in state court.218 
Of course, state postconviction review is not synonymous with state 
habeas review, but if that distinction were important, one might 
expect it to register in at least some federal opinions. I have been 
unable to locate a single one. 
Third, conceptualizing the federal enforcement mechanism for 
a state privilege is a challenge. If a state unconstitutionally restricted 
habeas relief in a particular case, then the prisoner would need federal 
enforcement. Relying exclusively on the appellate review in the 
Supreme Court is a dubious enforcement model.219 Using lower federal 
courts to enforce a Type 4 privilege, on the other hand, would be a tad 
ironic. The state custody would become unlawful only after the state 
violated the Type 4 privilege, at which point a federal enforcement 
action would ripen. The vehicle for such à la carte review of state 
custody is . . . a federal habeas proceeding. Naturally, constructing a 
Type 4 privilege to avoid federal habeas process makes little sense if 
the only plausible way of enforcing the privilege necessarily entails 
that very same process.220 
B. The Type 2 Federal Privilege for Federal Prisoners 
The case for interpreting the PI Clause to guarantee a Type 2 
privilege is a lot stronger than the accounts necessary to support other 
outcomes. The Fourteenth Amendment and the 1867 Habeas Corpus 
Act were both outputs of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, in which 
Republican membership was struggling internally with a consensus 
approach to Reconstruction and was at loggerheads with President 
 
 217.  For an explanation of the relationship between a habeas privilege and sovereign 
protection, see infra Part IV.B.5. 
 218.  See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 
483, 488 (1969)) (“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when 
mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions . . . .”).  
 219.  Its direct review of the custody determination necessarily precedes any state collateral 
adjudication, so there would always need to be an additional round of review to adjudicate the 
collateral restriction. Supreme Court review of state collateral determinations is technically 
feasible, but the idea of the Supreme Court reviewing all state custody is unappealing and, to say 
the least, unlikely to be what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had in mind. 
 220.  Of course, if Congress stripped the federal habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts, then this version of the incorporated habeas privilege would just be a right without a 
remedy. I am not arguing that every constitutional right requires a judicial remedy, but I am 
making a more atmospheric point: the adopted vehicle would, ironically, place more pressure on 
the vehicle nominally avoided. 
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Andrew Johnson.221 Republicans had used the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s promise to secure their seats on one end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue and were about to try to evict the occupant 
living at the other.222 When Congress submitted the Fourteenth 
Amendment for state consideration, almost all of the Southern 
governments rejected it on the first go-around, and there was real 
doubt as to whether they would approve it on a second.223 The 
Reconstruction Acts were therefore designed to kneecap the wayward 
Southern governments and to promote replacements more receptive 
to, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment.224 With much of 
their proposed legislation left vulnerable amidst the rift with 
President Johnson and with the uncertain status of restoration,225 
Congressional Republicans were simply trying two different ways to 
skin the cat: they were expanding the habeas privilege through both 
veto-proof legislation and a constitutional amendment.226 
Congressional Republicans wanted an amendment redundant 
of statutory habeas principles for the same reasons they wanted an 
amendment redundant of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: because the 
Fourteenth Amendment would make the statutory principles immune 
both from adverse judicial review and from legislative reversal when 
rebellious states were restored.227 Habeas legislation and the 
Amendment were ultimately successful, so the 1867 Habeas Corpus 
Act was as much a definition of the privilege specified in the 
 
 221.  See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 162–68; Raoul Berger, Activist Indifference to Facts, 61 
TENN. L. REV. 9, 27 (1993).  
 222.  For a succinct account of the impeachment of President Johnson, see Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., Reflections on Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 696 (1999). 
 223.  Florida, Georgia, and Texas rejected the Amendment before the beginning of the second 
session. BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 212. The rest of the rebellious states soon followed, 
prompting congressional Republicans to rethink how the conditions for restoration would relate 
to the Amendment. See id. at 212–17 (explaining the internal debates between radical and 
conservative Republicans on how to proceed). For a substantial book on Fourteenth Amendment 
consideration in the former confederacy, see BOND, supra note 85. 
 224.  See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 
500–01, 505–06 (1989). 
 225.  Although the House had not yet impeached him, President Johnson had vetoed two 
signature pieces of the 1866 Reconstruction legislation: the Civil Rights Act and the Freedman’s 
Bureau Bill. See ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 287–90, 314–15 
(1960). 
 226.  See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 169 (explaining how the Reconstruction Committee 
“accepted as its basis of action” that it would incorporate “into one constitutional amendment 
nearly all the elements of the centrist program”). 
 227.  For a discussion of the relationship between the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra notes 77, 128, 225. 
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Amendment as an effectuation of it.228 That privilege entitled state 
prisoners to a federal habeas forum. 
1. Rejecting the Redundant Type 1 Interpretation 
If the PI Clause protects some habeas privilege, then might it 
be one with Type 1 features: a federal privilege to test federal custody? 
Unlikely. Positioning Type 1 features as a product of the PI Clause 
would mean that the PI Clause changed nothing about the guarantee 
whatsoever—an outcome inconsistent with the Part III’s basic 
premise.229 All available information indicates that the PI Clause 
changed at least something about the habeas guarantee. 
The Fourteenth Amendment did bar states from abridging the 
privilege, but under the Supremacy Clause,230 states could not abridge 
a Type 1 privilege under the original Constitution anyway.231 
Professor Crosskey recognized this problem and believed (incorrectly, 
by my lights) that Fourteenth Amendment contact guaranteed some 
state habeas privilege.232 Interpreting the PI Clause to guarantee 
nothing more than a federal habeas forum to federal prisoners is 
redundant enough to disqualify the outcome from the potential 
solution set. 
2. Declaring a Habeas Privilege, Circa 1868 
Because the PI Clause performs the “declarative function,”233 
someone constructing the Clause’s effect on the habeas privilege would 
be more interested in the scope of the privilege in 1868 than in 1789. 
Albeit far from a consensus, more and more scholars are endorsing 
Reconstruction, not the Constitutional Convention, as the historical 
 
 228.  For this reason, the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act was not an anticipatory exercise of 
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but legislatively defined the 
scope of the privilege the PI Clause requires. 
 229.  Even if the Articles of Constitution did not guarantee a federal privilege to contest 
federal custody, an outcome with Type 1 features would still result in no change in the existing 
relationship. 
 230.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 231.  See Amar, supra note 35, at 1258–59:  
Miller had in mind only state interference with efforts to assemble and petition the 
federal government, and to secure habeas relief on the basis of federal laws in federal 
courts . . . . Clearly the supremacy clause standing alone, or as glossed by [McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)], would have sufficed to prohibit state 
interference with federal petitions and federal writs. 
 232.  See CROSSKEY, supra note 135, at 1129. I reject the state-privilege outcomes for the 
reasons set forth in supra Part IV.A. 
 233.  See supra Part III.D (explaining that the PI Clause declares the habeas privilege to be 
a right of national citizenship). 
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starting point for interpreting and constructing phenomena touched 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.234 The case for this paradigm shift is 
strongest when the phenomenon at issue—such as the habeas 
privilege—touches on the basic relationship between federal courts 
and the states. Even the Slaughter-House majority expressed the view 
that the “privileges or immunities” referenced in the PI Clause 
required it to look to the features of the pertinent rights during 
Reconstruction.235 People with certain interpretive commitments—
that the only data pertinent to constitutional interpretation and 
construction is from 1789—will have no truck with my account.236 But 
I want to convince everyone else. 
When construing the PI Clause, we tend to focus on only the 
opening words in the second sentence: “No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States . . . .”237 The second sentence of Section 1 is a self-
contained expression of what I call the “anti-abridgment” function, a 
limitation on state action. In combination with the first sentence, 
which provides that all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States are citizens of the United States, the second sentence also 
performs a subtle declarative function. The PI Clause declares not 
only that there are privileges and immunities of national citizenship, 
but also the fact of national citizenship itself. That particular 
declaration was extremely significant. 
 
 234.  Professor Kurt Lash, for example, has written three articles on what one might call 
“privileges or immunities originalism.” See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or 
Immunities Cause, Part III: Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 
GEO. L.J. 1275, 1281 (2013) [hereinafter Lash, Origins, Part III] (arguing that popular rejections 
of Johnson’s “alternative” amendment replacing the PI Clause with the language of the Comity 
Clause shows that the set of privileges and immunities contemplated by the PI Clause was more 
expansive than the set contemplated by the Comity Clause); Lash, Origins, Part II, supra note 
102, at 337 (arguing that a first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment protecting common-law 
rights was rejected in favor of the final draft that left common-law rights to the states); Kurt T. 
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Cause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as 
an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1243–44 (2010) [hereinafter Lash, Origins, Part I] 
(arguing that the term “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” was an 
Antebellum term of art with meaning separate from state-conferred privileges and immunities). 
 235.  See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872) (explaining the need to 
look to privileges established by Reconstruction Amendments). 
 236.  Those judges and scholars more popularly coded originalist might disclaim reliance on 
the status of the right after Fourteenth Amendment ratification, opting instead to assess the 
scope of the right under the native constitutional provision. See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth 
Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 1012 (2012) (arguing that scholars who attempt to 
understand constitutional rights through the lens of Reconstruction are not usually categorized 
as “originalists”). 
 237.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Before the Civil War and Reconstruction, state citizenship was 
the atomic unit of political membership;238 the existence of national 
citizenship was in doubt.239 By implication, the rights attached to 
national citizenship status were also unclear. The Civil War created a 
national state, and Reconstruction—largely through Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—made national citizenship concrete.240 In 
Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney had bottomed the holding that African 
Americans could not invoke federal diversity jurisdiction on the theory 
that, whatever the status of their state citizenship, they were not 
citizens of the United States.241 He then characterized the right to go 
to federal court as a “privilege” of citizens.242 House Republican John 
Bingham, Senator Jacob Howard, and other pivotal members of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress made the connection between Dred Scott and 
the Fourteenth Amendment explicit; they sought, among other things, 
to declare national citizenship.243 In a less contentious portion of 
Slaughter-House, Justice Miller recognized the declarative function of 
the PI Clause, vis-à-vis Dred Scott: 
[Section 1] opens with a definition of citizenship . . . of the States. No such definition 
was previously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by 
act of Congress. . . . It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the 
United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the 
Union. . . . Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided. 
But . . . [the Court held, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)], only a few years 
before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent . . . was not and could 
 
 238.  See Lash, Origins, Part I, supra note 234, at 1259, 1282–83 (illustrating that, under 
antebellum law, Article IV was interpreted to indicate that the “privileges and immunities” 
conferred by the Constitution were separate from privileges and immunities (rights) conferred by 
state law). 
 239.  See Lash, Origins, Part III, supra note 234, at 1293 (explaining that Johnson’s veto of 
the Civil Rights Bill indicated that he believed “Congress lacked constitutional authority to 
confer the status of national citizenship”); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National 
Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 335 (2006) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause caused a “fundamental transformation of nationhood”). 
 240.  See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 
277 (1988) (“[T]he Civil War created a national state and Reconstruction added the idea of a 
national citizenry whose common rights no state could abridge . . . .”). 
 241.  See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405 (1856) (“It does not by any means follow, 
because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the 
United States.”). 
 242.  Id. at 403. 
 243.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“[I]t 
was intended by the framers of the Constitution that the day should Come when the words ‘free 
person’ in the Constitution would cease to be operative, for the simple reason that all would be 
free and none bond in the United States.”); id. at 2765 (statement of Senator Howard) (arguing 
on behalf of the Senate drafting committee of the Fourteenth Amendment for the inclusion of the 
Citizenship Clause); id. at 3032 (statement of Senator Henderson) (“The Federal Constitution 
failed to define United States citizenship and equally failed to declare what classes of persons 
should be entitled to its privileges.”). 
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not be a citizen of a State or of the United States. This decision . . . was to be accepted as 
a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship . . . . To remove this difficulty 
primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which 
should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also 
citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed.244 
If the urgent declarative function of the PI Clause was to 
declare the fact and content of national citizenship,245 then the urgent 
anti-abridgment function involved the states. There was no analogous 
urgency with respect to restrictions on the federal government because 
limits on federal action inhered in the declaration of privileges and 
immunities incident to national citizenship. If the habeas privilege is a 
privilege of national citizenship, then the federal government cannot 
abridge the privilege any more than the states can. 
3. The Interpretive Significance of Pre-1867 Habeas Law 
By 1868, lawmakers had been primed to accept the reality of 
expanded privilege scope. Even before the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
(discussed in detail below), the federal privilege had grown beyond the 
metes and bounds originally set by the Judiciary Act of 1789.246 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the courts and 
Congress put to rest the idea that the privilege could not reach 
custody of state sovereigns. Habeas power could operate in personam 
on state jailors, just like anybody else. 
Congress enacted two antebellum privilege expansions vesting 
federal judges with habeas power to discharge state prisoners. Neither 
was a generalized habeas power over state detention; each targeted a 
particular form of state custody. When South Carolina flirted with 
nullification,247 Congress passed the pejoratively  titled Force Act of 
 
 244.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72–73 (1872). At least insofar as 
Justice Miller positions the PI Clause as a response to Dred Scott and as a means of declaring 
the fact of national citizenship, he is almost certainly correct. See Crosskey, supra note 135, at 4–
5 (“[T]he purposes of the initial provision of the amendment defining state and national 
citizenship seem perfectly clear: the foregoing doctrine of the Dred Scott Case was to be 
nullified . . . .”). 
 245.  See Ackerman, supra note 224, at 509–10 (describing one of the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as defining national citizenship and reversing Dred Scott); James E. 
Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1925, 1958 (2004): 
The switch to a focus on the rights of national citizenship corresponded to an 
emphasis on national citizenship in the opening sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and its declaration that all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States are citizens of both the United States and the state in which they reside. 
 246.  See Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 247.  See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, 
AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 75–76 (1987) (describing the drafting of the Ordinance of 
Nullification that would declare the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void in South Carolina). 
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1833, which basically extended the privilege to federal officials taken 
into state custody for doing their jobs.248 In 1842, Congress again 
extended the habeas privilege, targeting state custody exercised over 
foreign nationals acting on official behalf of their home countries.249 
Neither statute embodied a general habeas power to review 
state custody, but the 1833 and 1842 Acts established that the habeas 
privilege could rely on federal judicial power to discharge prisoners 
from state custody.250 To be sure, those laws were expressing 
congressional powers rather than fulfilling constitutional obligations; 
but they reflect a gradual change in how the privilege helped 
distribute power between federal and state governments. So, when the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress went about its work, the country was primed to 
accept a state-prisoner privilege as an incident of national citizenship. 
4. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 
The Fourteenth Amendment entitles a state prisoner to a 
federal habeas forum not because the PI Clause “incorporated” the 
privilege against the states but because the Clause restricted the 
federal government. I have already discussed some legislative history 
pertinent to Fourteenth Amendment interpretation,251 but I want to 
focus on the coinciding legislative history of the 1867 Habeas Corpus 
Act.252 For my purposes, the latter legislative history may provide a 
 
 248.  See Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634–35:  
[A] judge of any district court of the United States . . . shall have power to grant writs 
of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners . . . where he or they shall be 
committed or confined on . . . for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a 
law of the United States . . . . 
Federal judges later used Force Act provisions to free federal officials arrested by Northern 
States for enforcing fugitive slave laws. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965 (S.D. Ohio 
1856) (using the Force Act to free a federal marshal who was held in contempt and jailed by a 
state court).  
 249.  See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (1842): 
[A] judge of any district court of the United States . . . shall have power to grant writs 
of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where 
he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, 
shall be committed or confined . . . for or on account of any act done or omitted under 
any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or 
claimed under commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State or 
Sovereignty . . . . 
 250.  See William M. Wiecek, The Great Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, 36 J. S. HIST. 530, 534–35 (1970) (explaining that, until the Force Act of 1833 and Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1842 increased the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts, “federal habeas relief 
was available only when the petitioner had been confined by an order of a federal court and only 
before trial”). 
 251.  See infra Part III.A (discussing the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 252.  See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (expanding the jurisdiction of 
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for state prisoners). 
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window into the contemporaneous understanding of the habeas 
privilege bound to national citizenship by the PI Clause. 
The 1867 Act was a central feature of the Republican 
Reconstruction plan because it furnished a federal remedy for state 
violations of newly announced federal rights.253 Its text and legislative 
history sound in the same register of federal supremacy as do the 
other pieces of Reconstruction legislation—specifically, legislation 
clearing the path to a federal courthouse.254 The Act moved through 
exactly the same committees as did all important Thirty-Ninth 
Congress work product. The prominent Republican lawmakers 
populating these committees also boasted membership on the all-
powerful Joint Committee on Reconstruction.255 To characterize as 
coincidental recurring language in the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
1867 Habeas Act, and other Reconstruction legislation—or as 
ornamental textual alterations in those laws—is to ignore the basic 
structure of Reconstruction lawmaking.256 
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 entitled state prisoners to a 
federal habeas forum, which dramatically expanded the privilege 
beyond that provided under 1789 Judiciary Act.257 The Thirty-Ninth 
Congress submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states on June 
 
 253.  See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 532, 538 (explaining that the Act changed the nature of 
the writ of habeas corpus and allowed federal courts to exert their primacy in deciding questions 
about individual liberties). 
 254.  See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas 
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2064 (1992) (discussing how statutory 
provision for writs of error and habeas corpus, as well as for removal, clearly shows that 
Congress wanted to maximize federal court review of state court decisions); see also Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal 
Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 
800–05 (1965) (representing perhaps the most comprehensive work on the centrality of federal 
habeas and removal jurisdiction). 
 255.  See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 143–44 (detailing membership of Joint Committee). 
 256.  See, e.g., Liebman supra note 254, at 2049 (underscoring intended resemblance of 
Reconstruction habeas and removal legislation); Steiker, supra note 4, at 886 (“A ‘contextual’ 
reading of the habeas statute does not suggest a series of isolated jurisdictional developments. 
Rather, these statutes reveal Congress's overall effort—through removal, writ-of-error, and 
habeas jurisdiction—to enhance opportunities to adjudicate federal questions in the federal 
courts.”); Wiecek, supra note 250, at 531 (drawing parallels between development of habeas and 
removal jurisdiction during Reconstruction). 
 257.  See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103, 105 (1844) (holding that the court did not have the 
authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus for a state prisoner). Between 1789 and 1867, the two 
intervening provisions reaching state custody were quite limited. When South Carolina moved to 
nullify federal tax law, Congress passed the Force Act of 1833, which created a habeas remedy 
for federal officials arrested for enforcing federal law. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 
4 Stat. 634 (1833). Responsive to a diplomatic crisis, the 1842 Force Act created a remedy for 
foreign representatives acting in their official capacities. Habeas Corpus Act of 1842, ch. 257, 5 
Stat. 539 (1842). 
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13, 1866,258 and passed the Habeas Corpus Act on February 5, 1867.259 
When the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and it went into 
effect on July 28, 1868,260 the PI Clause constitutionalized a federal 
habeas privilege that reached state custody—the very privilege that 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress had created the year before. 
There is little legislative history on the 1867 Habeas Act, a 
vacuum allowing long-standing dispute over whether the Act was 
meant to authorize federal habeas review of state criminal 
convictions.261 The issue of postconviction review, however, is distinct 
from the more general issue of whether the Act empowered federal 
judges to reach state custody generally. (I discuss the postconviction 
issue in Section IV.C.) The 1867 Habeas Act’s plain text clearly 
establishes a general habeas power over state jailors. One might 
challenge the broad textual interpretation, however, by arguing that 
Congress designed the statute with a narrower purpose in mind. The 
Act was designed, the purposivist might argue, only to secure the 
liberties of Southern loyalists and freedmen,262 the latter of which 
were suffering under the Black Codes proliferating throughout the 
South.263 In turn, the more narrow, purposivist interpretation 
facilitates the conclusion that “there is no foundation for the Court’s 
assertions that the 1867 act was intended to afford a new remedy for 
state prisoners.”264 
The narrowing interpretation requires an interpreter not only 
to ignore text but also to engage in a rather strained reading of the 
legislative history. Advocates of that interpretation place far too much 
emphasis on an early resolution initiating the drafting process,265 
 
 258.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866). 
 259.  See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1867)). 
 260.  The last state that needed to ratify the Amendment had actually done so earlier in the 
month, but July 28 is the day that Secretary of State William Seward declared the Fourteenth 
Amendment effective. See Sec’y William H. Seward, U.S. Dep’t of State, Proclamation No. 13, 15 
Stat. 708 (1868). 
 261.  See supra note 73 (citing the work of two professors with opposing views on the 
subject). 
 262.  See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review 
Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1113 (1995) (“Congress was specifically concerned 
with freedmen, or their children, held under apprenticeship laws.”). Almost all of these 
arguments build off an article on the Act’s legislative history by Professor Lewis Mayers. See 
Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 31, 31 (1965).  
 263.  See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988) (noting the Republican leadership’s proposed legislation to 
override codes that discriminated against former slaves). 
 264.  Mayers, supra note 262, at 55–56. 
 265.  See infra notes 280–94 and accompanying text (discussing the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867’s journey through Congress). 
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ignore explanations for statutory word choice that are completely 
consistent with the consensus understanding,266 and selectively omit 
important context about pertinent statements made by legislators 
after the Act passed.267 
On the final day of the Thirty-Eighth Congress—March 3, 
1865—President Lincoln signed a joint resolution declaring the 
freedom of military families.268 The Thirteenth Amendment had not 
been ratified, so the resolution was intended to reach persons not 
covered by the Emancipation Proclamation.269 A few days into the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, on December 19, 1865, Representative Samuel 
Shellabarger introduced a unanimously-consented-to resolution that 
the [Judiciary Committee] be directed to inquire and report . . . what legislation is 
necessary to enable [federal courts] to enforce the freedom of the wives and children of 
soldiers of the United States under the joint resolution of Congress of March 3 1865, and 
also to enforce the liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional 
amendment abolishing slavery.270 
At this point, the resolution contemplated that the Judiciary 
Committee recommend legislation securing the freedom of military 
 
 266.  See infra note 286 and accompanying text (quoting the response to a congressman’s 
concern about preserving judicial authority to discharge prisoners taken by the military 
governments). 
 267.  After asserting that various legislative point people misunderstood crucial parts of the 
legislation that they were drafting, Professor Mayers acerbically observed that they figured out 
what the legislation meant and expressed that understanding in floor debates two years later. 
See Mayers, supra note 262, at 39, 39–40 n.39 (suggesting Trumbull was ignorant of the bill’s 
purpose when he reported it and only understood two years later). Mayers does not convey the 
political context of the subsequent floor debates. Everyone—Democrats and Republicans—had 
switched positions because of the firefight over the bill repealing Supreme Court jurisdiction over 
habeas decisions in lower courts. See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 540, 542 (“The 1868 
debates . . . presented the anomalous spectacle of Republicans depreciating the scope of their 
1867 habeas corpus measure, while the Democrats argued for a liberal reading of the act.”). After 
Ex parte Milligan, most lawmakers believed that the Supreme Court was poised to strike down 
key pieces of Reconstruction. The Republicans were seeking to avert that result through the 
repealer, and the Democrats were trying to secure it. As a result, the Democrats were giving 
floor speeches making the repealed jurisdiction sound like the font of universal liberty, and the 
Republicans were trying to make it sound like no big deal. See id. 540–42. The legislators had 
not come to an authentic understanding of the 1867 Habeas Act; they were engaged in rank 
political posturing.  
 268.  J. Res. 29, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. (1865). 
 269.  The Emancipation Proclamation, which freed slaves only in slave states that remained 
in active rebellion, was an exercise of his Executive Authority to Command the Army and the 
Navy. See Abraham Lincoln, Final Emancipation Proclamation January 1, 1863, in LINCOLN: 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 424 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
 270.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865). Much of Mayers’ paper assumes that the 
Resolution remained the controlling description of legislative purpose throughout the processing 
of the bill. When subsequent remarks about the purpose or operation of the Act are inconsistent 
with the joint resolution, Professor Mayers describes the speakers as “ignorant” of the purpose of 
the Act; the comments were perfectly reasonable because the purpose of the Act had changed. 
See, e.g., Mayers, supra note 262, at 38–39 (analyzing Senator Trumbull’s remarks). 
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families pursuant to the joint resolution of March 3, 1865, and  
the “liberty” of all persons pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.  
(The Secretary of State had certified the Thirteenth Amendment  
the day before Shellabarger’s resolution.)271 On January 8, 1866, 
Representative James Wilson, the Republican chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, introduced and referred to his committee a “bill 
to secure the writ of Habeas Corpus to persons held in slavery or 
involuntary servitude contrary to the Constitution of the United 
States.”272 
If the legislative history ended there, then the narrowing 
interpretation looks about right. But the Judiciary Committee—along 
with the Select Committee on Elections, ground zero for 
Reconstruction policy in the House273—dramatically expanded the 
scope of the bill when Representative William Lawrence reported it 
out of the committee on July 25, 1866.274 Lawrence was a conservative 
Republican275 and one of the most respected legislators of the 
Reconstruction era.276 Legal and historical scholarship favoring the 
narrow interpretation of the 1867 Act inexplicably treats the later 
version reported out of committee by Lawrence as an aberration while 
treating the earlier version referred into committee by Wilson as 
indicative of authentic statutory meaning.277 That scholarship has it 
exactly backwards. The bill that the House Judiciary Committee 
produced as output, rather than the one it took as input, is the 
superior reference point for any interpretive exercise predicated on the 
Act’s legislative history. 
The bill that Representative Lawrence reported out, which 
eventually became the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, had two sections. The 
first provided that “the several justices and judges” of the federal 
courts “shall have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in 
violation of [federal law.]”278 So, section 1 of the 1867 Judiciary Act 
extended federal habeas power to state custody. The second section—
 
 271.  Sec’y William H. Seward, U.S. Dep’t of State, Proclamation No. 52, 13 Stat. 774 (1865). 
 272.  Wilson’s Bill was not printed in the Congressional Globe, but Professor Mayers 
unearthed it at the National Archives. See Mayers, supra note 262, at 34, 34 n.16 (explaining the 
original handwritten bill is in the National Archives). 
 273.  See BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 96–97 (referring to the House Elections Committee as 
one of the most conservative committees in Congress). 
 274.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150 (1866). 
 275.  BENEDICT, supra note 97, at 28. 
 276.  See Wiecek, supra note 250, at 538 n.25 (describing Lawrence’s reputation). 
 277.  See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 262 (applying limit from Wilson’s proposed Bill to text of 
Lawrence’s); Mayers, supra note 262, at 37 (same). 
 278.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150 (1866). 
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which some have mistakenly described as “unrelated”—expanded the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to include, speaking generally, 
all determinations that state action did not violate the Constitution 
and all determinations that federal law did.279 That expanded power 
necessarily cemented Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas 
dispositions in inferior federal courts. “Unrelated” it was not. 
There are two important threads of legislative discussion that 
preceded passage of the 1867 Habeas Act, one from the House and one 
from the Senate. The House thread developed as Representative 
Lawrence reported out the Judiciary Committee bill. It contains a 
snippet of Lawrence’s floor speech, which entered the habeas canon by 
way of Justice Brennan’s flawed-but-iconic opinion in Fay v. Noia.280 
Lawrence conveyed that the House Judiciary Committee had proposed 
an amendment to section 2 of the Act, which provided that the Act 
would not apply to any prisoner who “is or may be held in the military 
custody of the military authority of the United States, charged with 
any military offense, or having aided or abetted [the rebellion prior to 
the passage of the Act.]”281 Some of his House colleagues expressed 
concern that the Act might deny the privilege to civilians taken into 
custody by the military.282 The famous snippet came as a response to 
Representative Francis Le Blond, an Ohio Democrat concerned with 
preserving judicial authority to discharge prisoners taken into custody 
by President Johnson’s military governments.283 The response seems a 
non sequitur: 
[T]he effect of [this bill] is to enlarge the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and make 
the jurisdiction of courts and judges of the United States coextensive with all the powers 
that can be conferred upon them. It is a bill of the largest liberty, and does not interfere 
with persons in military custody, or restrain the writ of habeas corpus at all.284 
Lawrence’s remark may have been a weak response to the 
objection, but the weakness lies in the fit between question and 
answer. The answer still expresses the thrust of the legislation: the 
privilege was going to get a lot bigger, and consistent with the text of 
the statute, it was going to reach all custody in violation of federal 
 
 279.  See id. at 4150–51 (summarizing section 2 of the Act). 
 280.  See 372 U.S. 391, 417 (1963), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) 
(referring to Rep. Lawrence’s description of the bill). 
 281.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866). 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. 
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law.285 Despite the confusion over the meaning of the military-custody 
exception,286 the bill passed the House.287 
When the bill moved to the upper chamber, the confusion over 
military detention spilled over to the Senate floor. That confusion 
notwithstanding, no one seemed to doubt that the bill otherwise 
extended the privilege to reach all unlawful custody.288 Senator 
Trumbull reported the House bill out of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on July 27, 1866.289 Trumbull dropped any reference to the 
Joint Resolution that had marked the beginning of the process, and he 
made the implications for state custody abundantly clear: “Now, a 
person might be held under a State law in violation of [federal law], 
and he ought to have . . . the benefit of the writ, and we agree that he 
ought to have recourse to [federal courts.]”290 After the same 
clarification regarding military custody that was necessary to move 
the bill through the House, as well as an amendment providing that 
judges from one judicial district could not issue habeas writs to 
prisoners in others, the bill passed the Senate.291 
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 became law on February 5. 
Almost immediately, federal judges—including Chief Justice Salmon 
P. Chase—began using it to thwart the South’s Black Codes.292 The 
Fourteenth Amendment, not coincidentally designed in part to 
 
 285.  Professor Mayers considers it significant that the statute referenced only “any person 
restrained of his or her liberty,” and did not mention state “custody” or jail. Mayers, supra note 
264, at 35 & n.18. Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, which furnished the original statutory 
habeas guarantee, had expressly referenced prisoners in jail. The selection of terminology, 
Professor Mayers believes, shows that the original intent of the statute was to extend the 
privilege only to freedmen and Southern loyalists. The terminological differences have much 
better explanations than the ones Professor Mayers provided. First, the term “jail” was used in 
the 1789 Judiciary Act—the term “gaol,” actually—to carve out an exception to an otherwise 
global habeas guarantee. Eliminating the reference to the word “jail” was a way of eliminating 
the exception, not extending it implicitly. Second, the statute does not mention state custody 
because many of the Southern states were not yet restored. Most of the South was under military 
control, not control of a state sovereign. Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution As 
Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2044 (2003). 
 286.  Advocates of the narrowing interpretation are fond of pointing out LeBlond’s floor 
comment that “it is exceedingly difficult for us to determine the scope of the bill.” CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866). That comment was in reference to the military-custody issue, 
not an expression of confusion over the fact that the grant of habeas power over state custody 
was a general one. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  See id. at 4228–29 (discussing ramifications of the bill in congressional debate). 
 289.  Id. at 4228. 
 290.  Id. at 4229. 
 291.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 790 (1867); see also id. at 903 (1867) (reporting that 
the House agreed to the amendment). 
 292.  Wiecek, supra note 250, at 541 (citing In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (D. Md. 1867)). 
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neutralize the Codes, was certified by the Secretary of State on July 
28, 1868.293 The habeas privilege, contemporaneously enforced by 
federal judges and guaranteed in the PI Clause, entitled a state 
prisoner to a federal habeas forum.294 The 1867 Habeas Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment were mutually reinforcing features of the 
federal supremacy established through Reconstruction.295 
5. Slaughter-House and “Protection” 
If the PI Clause referred to anything other than a federal 
forum, then the reference would have been news to the Slaughter-
House majority. Per Justice Miller, privileges of national citizenship—
such as the habeas guarantee—owe “their existence to the Federal 
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”296 
Some consider obvious Justice Miller’s allusion to a federal privilege to 
contest federal custody,297 but I struggle to find such clarity. Earlier in 
the opinion, Justice Miller actually references Chief Justice Chase’s 
use of the federal habeas power to review state custody.298 Moreover, 
Justice Miller twice emphasizes that the privileges and immunities of 
national citizenship include the right to seek “protection” from the 
 
 293.  15 Stat. 706 (1868). 
 294.  The idea that the set of “privileges” secured by the Fourteenth Amendment included a 
right of access to federal courts is not limited to the habeas account I offer here. Professor 
Pfander has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment created authority for Congress to extend 
the privilege of a federal diversity forum to American citizens residing in the District of 
Columbia and in federal territories. See Pfander, supra note 245, at 1968. (Such persons were not 
clearly covered under the original diversity grant because they were not “citizens of a state.” Id. 
at 1925–26.) 
 295.  I want to clear one last objection. Congress did not pass the 1867 Act in anticipation 
that it would have enforcement power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Section 5 
provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article.”) Congress already had all the power it needed to pass the Act under Article I, § 8 
(power necessary and proper to enumerated authority) or § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
(power to enforce antislavery content). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have 
Power . . . [to] make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 
(“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). Congress passed 
the 1867 Act because it was one of the two legislative strategies it was using to reconstruct the 
South and to restore the rebellious states: statute and amendment. If the Fourteenth 
Amendment had never been ratified, only then would a federal forum for state prisoners be a 
matter of legislative grace. 
 296.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).  
 297.  See, e.g., Amar, supra note 35, at 1258 (citing CROSSKEY, supra note 136, at 1128–30) 
(calling the narrow, federal-only application of constitutional habeas principles the 
“conventional” reading of Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion). 
 298.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 70. 
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federal government,299 a characterization consistent with a Type 2 
privilege for the reasons explained below.300 The better reading of 
Slaughter-House would assume reference to the contemporaneous 
scope of the habeas privilege—one with Type 2 features—absent some 
clear indication to the contrary. That privilege is access to a federal 
forum to contest any unlawful custody, whether under color of state or 
federal law. 
When Justice Miller twice indicated that privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship entail the federal government’s 
“protection,” he was saying something that probably resonated more 
in 1873 than it does now.301 An American citizen enjoys roughly the 
same relation to the sovereign as did an English subject at common 
law. As long as the citizen-subject maintained allegiance to the 
sovereign, there were privileges that corresponded to sovereign 
duties.302 The habeas privilege corresponded to a sovereign duty of 
“protection.”303 The Thirty-Ninth Congress operated with precisely 
this relationship in mind, which in turn reflected popular 
understanding of nineteenth-century political membership.304 And 
when the Thirty-Ninth Congress talked about the “protection” of law 
flowing from the habeas privilege, it was talking about a citizen’s 
entitlement to federal protection from unlawful state activity.305 
C. Postconviction Application 
I now attempt the subtle task of separating two issues that are 
almost always commingled to the detriment of anybody trying to 
understand either one of them. Whether the Constitution guarantees 
a federal habeas forum to contest certain forms of custody is a distinct 
question from whether that guarantee includes a privilege to contest a 
 
 299.  Id. at 79. 
 300.  See infra notes 302–06 and accompanying text. 
 301.  The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79. 
 302.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Broomall) 
(“Upon whatever square foot of the earth’s surface I owe allegiance to my country, there is owes 
me protection . . . .”); id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (“They are, by constitutional 
right, entitled to these privileges and immunities, and may assert this right . . . whenever they 
go within the limits of the [nation].”). 
 303.  See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1836–37, 1902 
(2009); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1866) (statement of Rep. John 
Broomall) (connecting right to federal protection with habeas privilege). 
 304.  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. James Wilson) 
(discussing the meaning of civil rights and immunities). 
 305.  See id. at 1263 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (explaining that federal protection 
was necessary because, among other things, the habeas privilege could not be “safely intrusted to 
the governments of the several States”). 
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criminal conviction. The constitutional status of the state-prisoner 
remedy is one that must be resolved before courts can reach other 
pressing habeas questions. 
If federal courts cannot resolve whether the Constitution 
entitles state prisoners to a federal habeas forum, then those courts 
avoid second-order questions about whether inmates may collaterally 
challenge a state criminal conviction. And if there is no clear account 
on which state inmates can obtain federal habeas review of their 
convictions, then courts can avoid third-order questions about the 
permissibility of certain restrictions on the habeas remedy in that 
context. 
The proposition that the PI Clause secures a federal habeas 
forum for state prisoners therefore has enormous implications for 
modern postconviction law. The PI Clause did not constitutionalize 
every jot of the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act. Given that the content of the 
privilege is defined largely by the set of jailers subject to federal 
habeas power, however, the PI Clause did constitutionalize the 1867 
Act’s major feature: the extension of judicial power to custody 
exercised under color of state law.306 Such habeas power entails 
judicial authority to entertain the petition for the writ, send it to any 
entity over which the United States may exercise personal 
jurisdiction, and order the prisoner discharged if custody is 
unlawful.307 The defining feature of habeas power at common law was 
that it allocated to judges the authority to determine what it means 
for custody to be “lawful.” Where a judge has habeas power over a 
custodian, there is judicial authority to say whether the detention is 
unlawful because the custodian is not authorized to detain the 
prisoner or because the process underlying the custody order renders 
it void.308 
Because a state prisoner’s constitutionally mandated habeas 
privilege corresponds to judicial power over state jailors, legislative 
restrictions on basic features of that power are unconstitutional.309 
The second half of Habeas Power shows that the judicial power 
corresponding to a federal privilege for federal prisoners should be 
immune from significant legislative restriction.310 The basic question I 
want to answer in this Part is what happens when that proposition 
combines with the proposition I have developed in this Article: that 
 
 306.  See supra Part IV.B.4. 
 307.  Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 760–64. 
 308.  Id. at 765. More precisely, the habeas power includes authority to declare detention 
unauthorized because of defects in the process producing the custodial order. 
 309.  Id. at 803–09. 
 310.  Id. at 795–810. 
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the federal privilege extends to state custody. The short answer is that 
judicially developed restrictions on a state-prisoner privilege are 
constitutional; legislative limits are not. Or, to state the conclusion 
differently, certain legislative restrictions on habeas power 
unconstitutionally burden the privilege. 
In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed 
AEDPA.311 AEDPA contained a raft of changes to the federal habeas 
statute. Two are most important for my purposes. First, AEDPA 
contained several new rules barring courts from considering the 
merits of procedurally defective postconviction challenges. Second, 
AEDPA modified 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), adding a precondition to federal 
relief for claims decided on the merits in state court. For such claims, 
a federal court cannot grant relief before determining that the state 
decision was either legally or factually defective.312 Section 2254(d)(1) 
contains the standard for legal defectiveness, and it is probably the 
most controversial rule in all of habeas law: the state proceedings 
must have “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”313 
Congress enacted harsh procedural limitations on relief, and 
§ 2254(d) seems to say that federal judges cannot make independent 
interpretations about what process produces lawful custody. The most 
basic question is whether AEDPA’s restrictions on federal habeas 
relief are constitutional. The almost-unanimous judicial consensus is 
that they are.314 So little dissent surfaces in part because of the gap 
that I target here: the absence of a satisfying constitutional account of 
a state-prisoner privilege. Were the Federal Constitution to require 
that state prisoners have a federal forum to contest the lawfulness of 
their custody, then courts would have to answer tough questions about 
whether AEDPA unconstitutionally restricts the habeas power that 
corresponds to the privilege. 
Any sentence in a habeas opinion that contains the familiar 
words “it is for the legislature to determine” is probably wrong, at 
least in part. I express no position on the prudence of habeas 
restrictions, but Habeas Power shows that the contours of those 
restrictions are to be shaped by judges, not legislators.315 The precise 
 
 311.  Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified in part at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2244–67 (2012)). 
 312.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (legal defectiveness); id. § 2254(d)(2) (factual defectiveness). 
 313.  Id. § 2254(d)(1). 
 314.  See Steiker, supra note 4, at 863 (describing the theory as having been “abandoned” by 
the Supreme Court). 
 315.  Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 795–810. 
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method for identifying “essential” features of habeas power is beyond 
my ambition here, and I do not proceed systematically through Title 
28 in order to assess the constitutionality of every habeas provision. 
The lattice of modern, statutorily imposed procedural restrictions is 
properly the subject of another article. Suffice it to say that if the 
same restrictions were prudential, rather than statutory, then one 
would be disputing their desirability more than their constitutionality. 
I will, however, commit myself to one specific position: if one 
accepts the view of habeas power detailed in Habeas Power, and 
accepts that it extends to state jailors, then AEDPA’s centerpiece, 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d), is unconstitutional. Section 2254(d)(1) was in many 
ways a statutory rule designed to mirror the judicial rule announced 
in Teague v. Lane.316 The “Teague bar” prevented convicted inmates 
from invoking most subsequent Supreme Court decisions to argue that 
their custody was unlawful.317 Teague’s basic effect was similar to that 
of § 2254(d)(1),318 but the fact that Teague was a judicially created rule 
makes all the difference. The Supreme Court can limit basic features 
of the habeas remedy; Congress cannot.319 Again, the basic habeas 
power allowing a judge to decide whether custody is lawful includes 
determining whether procedural errors preclude a finding of 
lawfulness.320 Congress can exert virtually complete control over what 
qualifies as lawful custody by changing substantive law, but it 
cannot—absent suspension—cheat the system by tweaking the habeas 
remedy. It cannot insulate criminal convictions by restricting federal 
habeas review to “unreasonable” errors. Because § 2254(d) bars a 
judge from discharging prisoners whose custody the judge might 
correctly determine to be unlawful, it unconstitutionally restricts the 
habeas privilege and the power to which it corresponds. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I offer a constitutional proof for the proposition that state 
prisoners are entitled to a federal habeas forum. A survey of pertinent 
habeas precedent and scholarship might lead one to (fairly) 
 
 316.  See 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that habeas corpus cannot be used to create new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure, unless such new rules will apply retroactively to all 
prior defendants on collateral review). 
 317.  See generally Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433 (1993) 
(providing overview of pre-AEDPA role of Teague). 
 318.  See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 
381, 414–21 (1996) (discussing Teague). 
 319.  Kovarsky, supra note 8, at 795–810. 
 320.  See supra note 308. 
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characterize my conclusion as idiosyncratic, but oddities and errors 
are different things. In fact, none of the subsidiary propositions 
comprising my proof are all that remarkable: the original Constitution 
guaranteed a habeas privilege, the privilege was yoked to national 
citizenship by the PI Clause, and that privilege is available to state 
prisoners. 
My previous article explained what habeas power entails, and 
this Article contends that the habeas power extends to state custody. 
Combining those two ideas yields the general insight sketched in 
Section IV.C: that constitutional problems arise when Congress 
severely restricts the ability of federal courts to review habeas 
petitions challenging state convictions. This sort of collateral review, 
however, is the major modern form of federal habeas activity. For that 
reason alone, broad-stroke decisions invalidating multiple pieces of 
the modern postconviction regime are unlikely. As a practical matter, 
change would have to be incremental. I have offered few answers on 
this front, although I hope to have guided readers to the right two 
questions: First, what are the best principles for identifying 
unconstitutional statutory limits on habeas power? And second, and 
more importantly, under those principles, which modern habeas 
restrictions make the cut? 
 
